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Abstract 
This thesis paper is an analysis of the 
relationship between defence policy and the unification 
of the Canadian Armed Forces.' While much of the 
literature and commentary in recent years has centered 
upon the *management* aspects of unification, this thesis 
argues that unification was devised in order to re-assert 
civilian control and direction over the services. 
Unification then, affects not only the administration 
of the services, but aiso, the * structuring of influence* 
between the civilian authority and the defence 
establishment, which in turn contributes to the method 
through which defence priorities are determined. 
The thesis also examines the congruence between 
the 'structuring of influence* as it pertains to defence 
policy and the transition in the policy-making process, 
which was to become evident as the avenues of political 
input expanded, differentiated and centralized. To this 
end, the thesis shall discuss the transition in the 
policy-making process during the tenure of Prime 
Ministers Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau in relation 
to the corresponding re-definition of defence priorities. 
A cknowledgem ent s 
Although unification of the Canadian Armed 
Forces has been subject to a great deal of analysis and 
criticism since its inception in 1963, such research 
has tended to provide evidence as to the issues and 
events which ensued, without however, paying sufficient 
attention to the interpretation of such evidence. The 
need for such an analysis is particularly acute because 
the ramifications of unification are still being felt. 
The Canadian military in recent years has undertaken 
a concerted search for a professional identity within 
the parameters prescribed by a re-orientation of 
defence priorities and by the *civilianization* of the 
defence establishment. In more recent months, the 
introduction of a separate Air Command has clearly 
presaged de-unification and the return to elemental, 
that is, land, sea and air command structures. This 
thesis then, examines unification within the context of 
defence policy and the policy-making process. 
While little effort is expended in an evaluation 
of unification per se, that is, in terms of its stated 
objectives, the author's bias is most favourable to 
unification. While recognizing that unification may 
not be applicable to considerably larger and more 
complex military establishments, unification is most 
- 5 -
amenable to Canada, given our defence requirements 
and national objectives. 
* * * * * 
It is certainly appropriate at this time to 
express my gratitude to the thesis supervisors: Prof. 
N. Nyiri, Wilfred Laurier University, the principal 
supervisor, who introduced me to the theoretical 
concepts employed within the thesis and who regularly 
made himself available for discussion and criticism 
of the thesis as it progressed; Dr. John Gellner, 
University of Toronto, whose comprehensive insight 
into Canadian defence problems was an immeasurable 
asset; Dr. Rod Preece, Wilfred Laurier University, 
whose expertise in the English language rescued the 
author on numerous occasions. 
J•C.H • 
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Introduction 
The unification controversy which erupted 
during the tenure of Paul Hellyer, Minister of National 
Defence, has created a crisis in Canadian civil-
military relations. The severity of the crisis was 
revealed through the premature * retirement* of several 
senior officers, and the outright dismissal of Rear 
Admiral Landymore(l), for opposition to Mr. Hellyer*s 
agenda for unification. Superficially, the conflict 
between the Minister and the service chiefs arose 
because of Mr. Hellyer*s proposal, not only to integrate, 
but to unify the forces, effectively eliminating the 
separate service branches. The implications of the 
debate however, had far more serious connotations, 
because what was fundamentally at issue was the 
sovereignty of the civilian authority over the military. 
This obviously did not mean that the military in Canada 
cherished aspirations to imitate the Seven Days in May(2) 
syndrome and usurp the constitutional government, but 
(1) Landymore was fired because he sought to organize, 
political opposition to unification through actively 
soliciting support for his views from the Navy. 
Hellyer argues that since unification already had the 
approval of Pearson and the Cabinet Defence Committee, 
Landymore*s actions were inexcusable. Interview with 
Paul Hellyer, August 29, 1975. 
(2) Seven Days in May A movie produced during the mid-
1960*s, in which a U.S. Army general, reminiscent of 
General Douglas MacArthur, plotted to overthrow the 
U.S. government because of the indecisiveness of its 
President. 
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it did nonetheless indicate that the military had 
intruded into the policy sector, which Mr. Hellyer 
considered intolerable and hence, set out to rectify. 
Of critical importance is why Mr. Hellyer was 
so adamant in his refusal to curtail the reorganization 
process at the integration stage, pursuant to the 
recommendations of the Glassco Commission(3). Had he 
done so, he would have avoided the painful schism which 
inevitably emerged between the government and the 
military, and in addition, the dismissal of malcontents 
in the navy need not have occurred. 
Integration, to the military, was reluctantly 
palatable, whereas unification was decidedly not. Even 
General Foulkes, who had long been a supporter of 
integration, balked at unification and subsequently 
became one of its most vociferous opponents. Lieutenant-
General Moncel, one of those * retired*, voiced the 
opinion that Mr. Hellyer; "appeared to be moving on an 
uncharted course, at very, very high speeds towards a very 
dim destination."(4) Nevertheless, despite his critics, 
and a chorus of resentment against the eradication of 
service traditions, Mr. Hellyer*s message was 
unequivocable: Nelsonianism had belatedly met its 
(3) Canada, Royal Commission on Government Organization. 
Hereafter referred to as the Glassco Commission. 
(Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1963). 
(4) Moncel, Lieutenant-General R.W., "Integration", in Snowy 
Owl. (Kingston: Canadian Army Staff College, 1965) p. 23. 
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demise and henceforth the military were to be supplicants 
to, not protagonists of, government policy. 
This research paper examines the relationship 
between defence policy and the policy-making process 
during the tenure of the Diefenbaker, Pearson and 
Trudeau governments. The emphasis is placed upon how 
defence priorities are defined and to what extent 
civilian control and direction of the military is effected 
relative to the transition which has occurred in the 
policy-making process. The thesis contends that prior 
to unification, there was a decided absense of civilian 
control over the military, that defence policy had been 
surrendered de facto to military influences, and that 
unification had been imposed by Paul Hellyer to ensure 
the prerogative of the civilian authority to determine 
defence policy, a prerogative, which he considered to 
be in jeopardy. It is also asserted that the changes in 
defence priorities and in the extent of civilian control 
are representative of the transition in the policy-
making process itself. 
Mr. Diefenbaker was unable to extricate himself 
from the morass created by alliance committments and 
equipment purchases which he had inherited from the 
previous Liberal government because his concept of 
policy-making would not permit any departure from 
incrementalism. Because policy-making to Diefenbaker 
was personalized, he failed to utilize the sources of 
policy input which could have been available to him; 
instead, he preferred to rely upon like-minded political 
friends. Since one of these was General Pearkes, whom 
Diefenbaker appointed as Minister of National Defence, 
the military was to have, in the absence of an 
authoritative civilian voice, excessive influence in the 
promulgation of defence policy. 
The Pearson years were characterized by the 
attempt to cultivate new sources of policy initiative 
and by allowing the input potential of executive policy 
apparatus to develop; such measures being conducive to 
innovative rather than incremental policy changes. The 
implications for defence were revealed through a 
Nreconfiguration of defence priorities while at the same 
x time maintaining alliance committments, and through a 
determined effort by Paul Hellyer to ensure, by means of 
* unification, that defence policy would have as its genesis 
government policy, not military policy. Although the 
, measures introduced by Mr. Pearson into the policy-making 
process and by Mr. Hellyer into defence did not come to 
fruition until Mr. Trudeau took office, the calamitous 
events from 1963 to 1968 set the stage for a radical 
conception of policy planning of which defence policy 
became an integral part. 
- 10 -
The innovations in policy-planning begun under 
Pearson were expanded and formalized under Prime Minister 
Trudeau. Many of the previous tenets of policy-making 
were discarded, and instead the premises of policy were 
to be based upon *rational planning* and *functionalism*, 
rather than *departmental* objectives. Trudeau launched 
a strident criticism against the basis of defence 
planning and insisted upon defence policy being in 
conformity with the fulfillment of national objectives. 
As many of the defence priorities Trudeau prescribed 
were * civilian* in nature, in co-ordination with other 
departments, the civilian direction of the Department 
of National Defence became more apparent. 
The thesis will conclude that unification did 
indeed involve a competition between the civilian 
authority and the military in the development of 
Canada's defence policy and that unification was the 
method through which the government asserted its 
supremacy. Yet, as time went on de-unification emerged 
as a detectable sign indicating that after all,civilian 
supremacy cannot be as total as the government wishes it 
to be. The degree of civilian control which the Trudeau 
government sought to effect, namely civilian participation 
in virtually all aspects of military policy, has in 
fact led to the breakdown of the unification process. 
- 11 -
De-unification illustrates the point that 
particularly in a technology-orientated society, 
government cannot hope to know and control everything 
without jeopardizing the same functions it has sought 
to expedite or improve. Excessive concentration of 
authority leads to the deterioration of the roles to 
be performed, as witnessed by the perceived decline in 
military professionalism, or, to the failure to recognize 
the necessity for 'special skills' which cannot be 
assimilated by a central hierarchy. Such attributes 
can be most deleterious to the discharging of Canada's 
defence responsibilities. 
- i-A - . 
Chapter I: Unification and the Policy Process 
in Canada 
(1) Scope and Methodology 
To examine the relationship between defence 
policy and the policy-making process, this research 
paper employs the typology of policy-making devised by 
G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin.(1) Doern and Aucoin 
focus upon the policy-making roles performed by policy 
organizations at the executive level. These organizations 
are the Prime Ministers Office (P.M.O.), the Privy 
Council Office (P.C.O.), the Treasury Board, the 
Department of Finance and other sources of policy input 
including advisory councils, White Papers, and Royal 
Commissions. Doern and Aucoin have concentrated upon 
the sources of policy input because they express the 
concern that policy analysts have tended to pay excessive 
attention to policy 'actors' and policy 'outputs* rather 
than focusing upon the affect of the policy process 
itself upon policy, that is, they are ultimately 
concerned with the * conversion* of policy inputs into 
outputs.(2) The implications of Doern and Aucoin*s 
research is that policy cannot be considered simply as 
the * allocation of values* but rather that policy is 
(1) Doern, G. Bruce and Aucoin, Peter, (ed.) The Structures 
of Policy-Making in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1971). 
(2) Aucoin, Peter, "Theory and Research in the Study of 
Policy-Making" in Doern, G. Bruce and Aucoin, Peter. 
op_. cit. p. 11 • 
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affected by the characteristics of the structures in 
which it is developed. 
The second and third sections of this chapter 
then, are devoted to the models of policy-making 
outlined by Doern and Aucoin and to the typologies of 
policy-making which they ascribe to Messrs. Diefenbaker, 
Pearson and Trudeau. 
The fourth section in this chapter critically 
appraises other research and explications of unification. 
The approach therein is to assess three papers on 
unification which have largely focused upon the 
•integration* aspects or upon the *rationalization of 
management*. The paper will also consider other factors 
such as operational efficacy and nationalism to determine 
what effect they may have had on the decision to unify 
the armed forces. In addition, the observations and 
recommendations of the Glassco Commission shall be cited, 
particularly with reference to the civilian control and 
direction of the services. 
Implicit to such an appraisal is the recognition 
that unification has been commented upon extensively in 
the press, and in both military and academic circles. 
However, it is the contention of this paper that such 
analyses, while undoubtedly providing some insight into 
the complexities of unification, do not provide a 
satisfactory explanation of it. Nor do operational 
- J..+ 
efficacy or nationalism provide appropriate categories 
for examination, although they may have been contributory 
factors. Even the Glassco Commission*s recommendations 
were predicated on integration. 
The Glassco Commission however, did touch upon 
a very significant point, that of civilian control. 
The issue of civilian control and the Canadian experience 
with it remain critical to an understanding of unification. 
Civilian control, which is discussed in sections five 
and six, has had a particularly unflattering legacy in 
Canada since the Second World War, and it becomes of 
paramount importance in an age of nuclear weapons and 
long-range delivery systems. It is the purpose then, 
of these sections to establish that there have been in 
fact, many precedents to illustrate that civilian control 
over the Canadian military is something less than 
inviolable. 
Having examined the evidence to support the 
thesis that civilian control had been impaired by the 
military, Chapters II, III and IV will analyse the 
relationship between defence policy and the policy-making 
process in the Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau 
governments, respectively. 
- 15 - . 
(2) Doern and Aucoin: Policy-Making Models 
The neglect of the conversion stage in policy 
analysis is attributed, according to Doern and Aucoin, 
to the assimilation of research methods which are more 
readily applicable to American political institutions. 
The incongruity of such American models for the Canadian 
policy process is made evident through the comparison 
of the President and his non-elected advisors and the 
policy role of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. In 
addition, the American policy system exhibits a *greater 
visibility of conflict* due to the early differentiation 
of roles brought about by the constitutional separation 
of power.(3) As a consequence, the American policy 
analyst perceives policy through *decision-making* 
models subject to the vagaries of pluralism. Because 
of such ambiguities between Canadian and American 
political systems, Doern and Aucoin set out to critically 
examine the shortcomings of such theoretical constructs 
in order to emphasize the need to study the * conversion* 
process. 
Charles Lindblom*s *disjointed incrementalist* 
model seeks to describe how policy actors *muddle 
through* a number of incrementally different policy 
alternatives, while at the same time failing to relate 
(3) Doern, G. Bruce and Aucoin., P., op_. cit. p.7. 
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various policy types to one another. By way of example, 
defence policy would be derived from prior commitments 
without necessarily attempting to relate such policy to 
the requirements of foreign policy. Such a model however, 
does not allow for the value assumptions of a particular 
policy to be questioned, thus fostering conservatism, 
nor does the model account for innovative policy. 
Policy is therefore seen as an attempt to "alleviate 
disruptions in the social and political system without 
promoting a 'fundamental* value change."(4) 
Since the incrementalist model does not account 
for innovative policy, and the rationlist model is 
'highly prescriptive', that is, policy-makers proceed 
in sequential steps to rank and evaluate both 
quantitative and qualitative alternatives, the 'mixed 
scanning' model of Amitai Etzioni is seen to 
incorporate aspects of both models. He suggests that 
the policy-maker will 'scan' alternatives when the 
'incrementalist' approach is not satisfactory. This 
'scanning of alternatives' implies a search for 
'fundamental* policy changes through the ranking of 
high priority items, the choice of alternatives being* 
even more circumscribed than those of the rationalist 
model.(5) 
(4) Aucoin, Peter, op_. cit. pp. 13-14. 
(5) Ibid. pp. 14-18 . 
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As opposed to first examining the policy process 
and then the policy outputs, Theodore Lowi argues that 
the outputs of policy must first be catagorized as to 
type, and then related back to policy processes, that >is, 
differing types of policy correspond, to different 
policy-making scenarios. *Distributive* policies are 
those directed to particular groups which are not in 
competition with others for the allocation of resources. 
This typology of policy-making is labelled * mutual 
non-interference* (and could just as easily be called 
pork-barrelling) and would include such items as the 
awarding of government contracts, tax concessions or 
government grants. Distributive policy then is carried 
out between relatively few policy actors and a particular 
interest group. 'Regulatory* policy refers to policy through 
which through the allocation of resources would 
* indulge* one group and deprive another. This would 
correspond to the * pluralist* conception of competing 
group interests whereby policy becomes *the residue of 
group conflict*. *Redistributive* policy is similar 
to the regulatory type but in this instance concerns 
broad social issues or class issues, requiring 
relatively permanent coalitions and the participation 
of large social or political groups in the policy-making 
process.(6) 
(6) Ibid, pp. 19-22. 
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The significance of Doern and Aucoin*s analysis 
of policy-making models is that those models which 
concentrate on decision-making, that is, the *disjoined 
incrementalist* and the *mixed scanning* models, 
cannot account for the actual nor unintended policy 
outputs, nor for the perceptions of the policy-makers 
on policy outputs. The * rationalist' approach, 
emphasizing 'pre-decision-making' factors; "explicate 
the logical sequences that should occur and by so 
doing...establish a strategy for approaching policy 
problems".(7) Policy-making is thus reducible to a 
'micro* concept focusing upon *decision*, This is of 
course unacceptable to Doern and Aucoin because such 
conceptualizations do not account, nor attempt to 
account, for policy-making being anything other than a 
dependent variable. They do recognize however, that 
Lowi*s work, through developing a relationship between 
substantive policy and policy-making, at least releases 
policy from its dependence upon decision. To Lowi, 
policy-making is a micro concept which results from the 
* coercive* aspect of politics, and therefore policy 
becomes * something other than undefined outputs 
differentiated only by subject matter."(8) 
(7) Ibid, p. 23. 
(8) Ibid, p. 25. 
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Doern and Aucoin*s departure from Lowi*s 
typology commences by suggesting that not all policy 
is of the 'distributive*, *regulatory* or *redistributive* 
type; rather, -that an analysis of policy-making must 
include a consideration of the * conversion* process 
which policy must pass through prior to becoming a 
policy output. Policy-making analysis then, must 
examine not only substantive policy but * positional* 
policy as well. 
"Positional, as opposed to allocative, 
policies refer to those outputs which 
affect the structuring of influence 
in the conversion system, A good deal 
of policy activity by individuals and 
groups is related not so much to 
securing (at least in the short run) 
an allocation of desired values but 
rather the attainment of desired 
positions vis-a-vis other individuals 
or groups. What is sought is a share 
of the coercive abilities of the 
government."(9) 
This does not imply that *allocative* and 
'positional* policies occur independently of one another, 
rather that positional policies often determine the 
outputs of allocative policy. As positional policy 
affects the ^ structuring of influence", "coercion" as 
pointed out by Lowi, becomes an integral "characteristic 
(9) Ibid. p. 25. 
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c 
of those policies emanating from government structures."(10) 
(3) Policy-Making Structures 
Having established the validity of positional 
policy for policy analysis, Doern and Aucoin proceed to 
examine the characteristics of policy-making structures 
in the Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau governments. 
They contend that the preponderance of positional 
policy, characteristic of the Trudeau period, has not 
been an abrupt change in the policy process but rather 
that there has been a gradual transition which has 
occurred concomitantly with innovative policy and 
programme management, as opposed simply to incremental 
policy changes. Doern and Aucoin hasten to point out 
however, that while the functions performed by the Prime 
Minister*s Office, the Privy Council Office, the 
Treasury Board and the Department of Finance have 
expanded and differentiated, the roles of such executive 
policy organs have not in themselves altered to a 
significant extent. The transition in the policy process 
is indicated by the expansion, differentiation and 
bureaucratization of the roles performed by these 
offices in policy development.(11) 
(10) Ibid, p. 26. 
(11) Doern, G..Bruce. "The Development of Policy 
Organizations in the Executive Arena", in G. 
Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin. op_. cit. p. 41. 
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The roles performed by the executive organs of 
policy-making during the Diefenbaker government have 
been catagorized as *fused*, 'passive* and * personalized*. 
The * fused* aspect was a carry-over from the MacKenzie-King 
period in that policy roles were largely accomplished by 
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, who was 
also the Chairman of the Treasury Board. The Prime 
Minister*s Office was largely confined to housekeeping 
tasks for the Prime Minister, although to the extent that 
these partisan logistic activities affected some policy, 
a P.M.O. "policy" role can be said to have been evident.(12) 
The Privy Council Office played a relatively "passive" 
function because staff shortages necessitated that 
their activities be relegated to co-ordination and 
secretarial roles in the service of the Cabinet. 
Nonetheless, from time to time, the Secretary to the 
Privy Council Office was consulted on policy matters, if 
only infrequently. The 'personalized* nature of policy 
development was evidenced by the relationship between Mr. 
Diefenbaker and R.B. Bryce as Secretary to the Cabinet. 
Bryce is described as a *one man administrative gang*(13) 
who enjoyed the flexibility and fusion of policy roles, 
which characterized the Prime Minister*s Office and the Privy 
(12) Ibid, p. 42. 
(13) Ibid, p. 43. 
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Council Office. Bryce*s position was implemented by 
the strongly control-oriented approach of the Deputy 
Minister of Finance. Thus financial matters were; "not 
backed by the hand of fiscal philosophy that would 
produce active initiative..."(14) 
The Pearson era witnessed the * structural 
differentiation* of policy-making organs. The separation 
of the Treasury Board from the Department of Finance, 
the addition of Tom Kent as Mr. Pearson*s policy 
adviser, and the introduction of the committee system 
in the Privy Council Office, were a reflection of the new 
managerial techniques advocated by the Glassco Commission. 
The Pearson government also introduced the Science 
Secretariat and the Special Planning Secretariat into 
the Privy Council Office to deal with policy reviews 
and innovative social policy. The significance of such 
structural changes resulting in increased differentiation 
and specialization of policy inputs was that such 
positional policies laid the groundwork for the programming, 
planning and budgeting (P.P.B.S.)(15) approach of the 
Trudeau government. 
The role of policy-making organs in the Trudeau 
government is viewed by Doern and Aucoin as differentiated, 
(14) Ibid, p. 44. 
(15) Ibid. pp. 47-57. 
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bureaucratized and active. Such a characterization 
emerges because of the rapid absorption of policy 
advisors into the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy 
Council Office. During Mr. Diefenbaker's tenure in 
office and, to a lesser extent, during that of Mr. Pearson, 
policy matters were brought to a full Cabinet, whereas 
under Mr. Trudeau, the Cabinet is presented with policy 
which has already been subject to scrutiny by one of 
the sub-committees appended to the Privy Council Office. 
Furthermore, the introduction of policy specialists, 
under Pearson, has matured into a P.P.B.S. system 
under Trudeau. 
(4) Unification of the Armed Forces: Reasons 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the issues 
of unification have been dissected from numerous sources, 
yet the greater proportion of such research has failed 
to provide a satisfactory justification for unification, 
at least within the context in which it occurred. The 
survey research conducted by Roddick Byers(l6) is 
however, a notable and illuminating exception to this 
trend. Byers has focused upon the perceptions of 
(16) Byers, R.B., "Canadian Civil Military Relations 
and Reorganization of the Armed Forces: Whither 
Civilian Control", paper presented to the Canadian 
Political Science Association in Winnipeg, 1970 
(Kingston: Canadian Political Science Association, 
1970). 
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civilian control held by senior military officers and 
has documented Mr. Hellyer*s trepidation as to the 
reality of civilian control. By and large however, 
both proponents and adversaries of unification have 
tended to concentrate upon essentially the same issues; 
military efficiency, cost-effectiveness and service 
tradition. The intention of this section therefore is 
critically to examine such arguments in order to 
determine whether such explications are a sufficient 
rationale for unification. 
(a) Allan, Kronenberg, Sherman 
Gordon Allan*s thesis, The Bending of the 
Sword(17) is, as the title would indicate, very much 
opposed to unification. Allan, while developing a 
history of the structure of the Canadian forces from 
Militia days, relies predominately upon the papers, 
unpublished manuscripts, parliamentary testimony and 
interviews with General Charles Foulkes. This 
undoubtedly would explain, to some extent, the fact that 
Allan*s thesis is generally consonant with the views held 
by General Foulkes, particularly with reference to the 
endemic frailties of a tri-service organization, but 
nonetheless rejecting unification as the panacea for 
such difficulties. In delineating his thesis, however, 
(17) Allan, Gordon. The Bending of the Sword, unpublished 
M.A. Thesis (Waterloo: University of Waterloo, 1971) . 
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Allan adheres to the criticisms of unification in the 
U.S. offered by Samuel Huntington that: 
"Experts in military organization, often 
argued that * unification* required either 
the merger of the four services into a 
single uniform or the abolition of the 
service and the organization of the 
Pentagon on a purely functional basis. The 
former proposal however, was blindly Utopian 
in rejecting the inevitability of pluralism, 
and conceivably the latter could intensify 
conflict to the point where it was 
unbearable."(18) 
Curiously, Allan appears not to have recognized that 
Huntington was referring, not to *unification* but to 
•integration* in accordance with the U.S. Reorganization 
Act of 195&. The unification to which the American 
forces objected to so strenuously was not so much a 
disagreement as regards policy-making among the defence 
establishment, as it was a rejection of the service 
priorities and resource allocations dictated by the 
civilian administration. Unification in the American 
context then, was perceived as an infringement by the 
civilian authority upon the military's ability to determine 
its own priorities according to separate service 
requirements. Huntington further commented in a seeming 
lament for pluralism and the demise of cherished 
traditions that: 
(18) Huntington, Samuel. The Common Defense 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) 
p. 423. 
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"Organizational permanence is the partner 
of strategic flexibility...that the 
castles of the services, like many of 
their medieval counterparts, will remain 
in existence, battered but unshaken, 
long after the decisive battles, both 
political and military, have shifted to 
other fields."(19) 
Vernon Kronenberg*s paper All Together Now(20) 
is not so preoccupied as is !!r. Allan*s, with the 
precursors to unification, but rather is concerned, and 
quite justifiably, with pre-judgments of unification 
that were predicated upon previous attempts at integration 
among support services. The failings of integration 
among support services were used as evidence to argue 
against unification. This was pursued however, without 
giving sufficient recognition to the varying contexts 
and requirements of headquarters, field and support 
personnel.(21) 
Kronenberg*s purpose was not to evaluate 
unification per se but to consider the basic issues 
involved and to trace the evolution of the programme at 
the headquarters level. In so doing, he has noted that 
(19) Ibid, p. 425. 
(20) Kronenberg, V.J. All Together Now: The Organization 
of the Department of National Defence in Canada 
1964-1972. previously written as an M.A. thesis at 
Carleton University, subsequently published in the 
Weliesley Papers (Toronto: Canadian Institute for 
International Affairs, 1973). 
(21) Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
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unification has proceeded through three distinct 
stages; integration, functional command and unification. 
The elimination of the separate service chiefs, the 
establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff and the 
integration of support organizations resulted in force 
integration, but the question remained as to how the 
commands would become operational.) 
'Functional* command(22) was originally introduced 
into the services, but because Canada possessed 
relatively few military personnel to protect an immense 
territory, functional command was necessarily tempered 
with geographical considerations. Interestingly enough, 
the nature of the functional-geographical debate gave 
rise to disagreement among the land, sea and air elements 
as to their particular requirements. The army*s 
position was that neither a strictly functional nor 
regional command structure was appropriate and 
therefore sought a compromise solution. Later however, 
they preferred functional command while allowing certain 
regional modifications, for example, control over 
militia contingents. The Royal Canadian Air Force 
(R.C.A.F.) insisted upon strict functional command 
because they felt that geographical organization under 
(22) Functional command refers to a task-orientation 
of service roles, which may combine all three 
service elements under a single hierarchy. 
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a single commander responsible for all services would 
hamper flexibility and be economically deleterious. 
The navy appeared unusually quiet throughout these events, 
presumably content in the knowledge that Maritime 
Command would remain relatively unmolested. After 
several changes in organization, the eleven service 
commands were reduced to six functional commands, and 
the NATO contingents brought directly under headquarters.( 
Those who opposed unification were seen by 
Kronenberg as belonging to one of two groups. The 
*traditionalists* bemoaned the loss of their identity 
and their uniforms which, so it was said, would make 
them the laughing stock and *virtual pariahs*(24) in 
naval circles. They also argued that this arrangement 
would prove difficult during combined allied operations. 
Those who presented their case from the strategic point 
of view however, could make a solid case against 
unification in that operational roles (management, 
logistics, training and actual combat) among the services 
have distinct characteristics^ Kronenberg correctly 
states however, that such arguments: 
"were largely beside the point...The aim 
of unification was not to sweep aside 
these facts of operational life, but to 
(23) Ibid, pp. 68-70. 
(24) Ibid. p. 81. 
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organize the forces so that operations 
could come under unitary control."(25) 
Michael Sherman, currently with the Hudson 
Institute, has critically examined unification relative 
to its espoused aims in 1964. Sherman states that while 
the integration phase has undoubtedly produced economic 
advantages, Hellyer's much heralded 25 per cent budget 
allotment for new capital equipment fell short 
of its objectives. In addition, he questioned the 
wisdom of administrative efficiency which posited the 
Chief of Defence Staff as the sole, formal military 
channel to the Minister. In essence, however, Sherman's 
appraisal of the integration phase is positive, but he 
retains misgivings about unification, citing the 
concerns of senior staff about the pace at which 
unification was being pursued. Through the examination 
of Canada's defence commitments, Sherman argues that 
the benefits of integration are themselves sufficient 
and that unification is unnecessary and possibly 
damaging to the services. He concludes that: 
"the single-service conclusion would seem 
to follow only if the nation's military 
responsibilities were so specialized that 
all fighting elements were related to 
all others...some combat functions will 
have as little to do with others, as say, 
anti-submarine warfare and peacekeeping."(26) 
(25) Ibid, p. 80. 
(26) Sherman, M. "A Single Service for Canada" in 
the Adelphi Papers. (London: Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 19671 No. 39, P- 9. 
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The difficulty with the fore-mentioned studies 
is that they concentrate almost exclusively upon 
unification, its merits and demerits, in the absence 
of perceiving unification as a part of the political 
process; it is therefore necessary to explore other 
factors which may have influenced unification. 
(b) Operational Effectiveness 
( While the detractors of unification have argued 
that the elimination of the three services has had 
undesirable effects, there is nonetheless, agreement 
that 'combined operations* composed of land, sea and 
air elements, are fundamental to modern military 
strategy. Unification would as a consequence, bring 
about equipment standardization and 'support* service 
integration. These factors would uphold the thesis that 
modern 'conventional* warfare is indivisible and that 
it is both anachronistic and redundant to allow for the 
existence of three services, at least, at the headquarte 
level. It could therefore be reasoned that unification, 
not just integration,(27) would be the only logical 
conclusion./ John Gellner has stated that the separation 
(27) Integration unifies the services at the Chiefs of 
Staff level while retaining separate services; 
unification merges the services into one unit 
having a single hierarchy throughout the command 
structure. 
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of service elements was self-defeating beginning with 
the advent of steam power.(28) 
"There can be little doubt that theoretically 
one service is best. It is also the 
obvious solution because the historical 
reasons that did exist for a division have 
either disappeared, as in the case of the 
separation of sea and land warfare, or 
have never been valid, as is the 
separation of air from sea and land 
warfare."(29) 
The concern of Canadian officers over the 
condition of the armed forces after World War II and over 
management by committee was exemplified by the 
scathing criticisms of Major-General W.H.S. Macklin: 
"Canada*s armed forces are completely 
uncoordinated and incapable of providing 
this country with an adequate defence. 
The overall defence organization is 
chaotic. The armed forces cannot act 
in any operation of war, there is no 
policy or plan to use them in combination."(30) 
Citing the reorganization of the Canadian forces in 1946, 
Major-General Macklin stated that: 
"the principle of unity of direction was 
thrown out with the garbage. The dead 
weight of outworn sentiment masquerading 
as tradition, and the influences of 
vested interests within the services 
Gellner, John. Lecture Notes, University of 
Toronto, 1974. 
Gellner, John. "Service Unification in Canada" 
in Military Review, April (Fort Leavenworth: 
United States Army Command and General Staff 
College, 1967)' p. 6. 
Macklin, Major-General W.H.S. "Claims Canada*s Forces 
Completely Uncoordinated", in Montreal Daily Star 
March 20, 1959* 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
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and in the civil service and industry 
carried the fie Id. "(3D 
In 1958, an editorial in the Halifax Chronicle Herald 
summed up the issue of committee rule fairly well: 
"there must be one military man who 
wields absolute military authority. 
Co-operation works only when there 
exists a competent commander willing 
to knock the heads together of those 
who do not co-operate."(32) 
There were thus sound military reasons for 
unification or, at least for the abolition of the totally 
unwieldy committee system, which integration would 
accomplish. Many officers of course, recalling the 
difficulties incurred through previous integration 
attempts were reluctant to pursue with unification but 
the adherents of unification replied with the 
observation that: 
"integration has been tried before and 
has not worked. Co-operation has 
been continually called for, but so 
many examples exist of attempts at 
integration failing that the obvious 
conclusion is that it is a delusion... 
What is called for is a formal marriage... 
the centrifugal influence apparent in 
all members of a group of sister services 
(31) Macklin, Major-General W.H'iS.' "Unify Our Three 
Services*, in Montreal Daily boar, September 22, 
1956. 
(32) Editorial, "United Armed Forces or Chaos", in 
Halifax Chronicle Herald, August 15, 1958. 
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* 
sooner or later to the collapse 
of attempts at integration"(33) 
(c) /Nationalism) 
Canadian resistance to domination by Imperial 
fiat has left an indelible imprint on the seemingly 
relentless Canadian passion for affirming her 
identityJ In a military context, nationalist 
aspirations became particularly acute in two situations, 
the Army of Occuption in Europe, and the Suez crisis. 
As early as 1943, the Canadian government 
was approached by the British as to Canada*s 
participation in the post-war settlement and policing 
duties. External Affairs insisted that Canadian 
participation be linked directly to a voice in post-war 
decision-making. It was felt that Canada's 
participation should depend not only upon her potential 
role in occupation but also upon her actual contribution 
to the defeat of Germany. The opinion of the 
British was expressed by Lord Halifax, British 
ambassador to Washington, that contrary to Canadian 
(33) Emmott, N.W. "The Case for Canadian Military 
Unification", in Air Force and Space Digest 
(Washington: Air Force Association, 1967) 
pp. 78-80. 
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desires, Commonwealth policy must be a policy of 
unity.(34) 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King sharply disagreed 
with Lord Halifax, asserting .that his statements came: 
"like a shot out of the blue, like 
a conspiracy on the part of the 
imperialists to win their own victory 
in the middle of the war."(35) 
Mackenzie King strongly urged that colonial policy be 
replaced by 'functionalisra* through which: 
"those countries which have most to 
contribute to the maintenance of 
peace should be most frequently 
selected for positions on inter-
national organization."(36) 
General MacNaughton, the Minister of National Defence, 
emphatically supported Mackenzie- King in his opposition 
to Canadian troops being used as a colonial force. Such 
support as General MacNaughton's was widespread, including 
that of the Canadian Institute of International 
(34) Kasurak, P.C. "Pawn in the Game of National 
Politics: Origins and Fortunes of the 
Canadian Army Occupation Force 1943-1946" in 
Canadian Defence Quarterly (Toronto: Defence 
Publications Ltd., 1975). Fall 1975. No page 
references are available since the quotations 
were taken from the publisher's galley sheets.' 
Kasurak's article will be published in October, 
1975. This applies to footnotes 34-38. 
(35) Ibid. 
(36) Ibid. 
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Affairs and Lester B. Pearson, who stated in 
reference to Canadian control of defence and foreign 
policy that: 
"in fact...we have no such powers and so 
far as policy and planning in this war 
are concerned, our status is little 
better than that of a colony."(37) 
Canada's aspirations continued to be rebuffed at the 
San Francisco Conference and at the United Nations 
Commission for Europe. Field Marshall Montgomery*s 
statement that a Canadian brigade could serve as 
Commonwealth *window dressing*(38) hardly served to 
popularize pro-British sentiment. Canadian troops were 
subsequently returned to Canada. 
The Suez crisis provided a second strident 
example of Britain's refusal to acknowledge nationalist 
sentiment in Canada. The British and French had 
simultaneously informed their allies of their intention 
to issue an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, meanwhile the 
ultimatum itself had already been delivered. The 
invasion which followed shortly thereafter created an 
embittered response from Canada. As James Eayrs has 
indicated, Britain did neither inform nor consult with 
her allies because: 
"to invite such opinion would be to 
invite disapproval so stern as to 
(37) Ibid. 
(38) Ibid. 
make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to carry out the policy".(39) 
While stated government response was not nearly so 
vociferous as might be anticipated, Mr. Pearson stressed 
that, Canada was not, "a colonial chore-boy running 
around shouting ready, Aye ready."(40) 
Further embarrassment for Canada, and 
particularly for Mr. Pearson, occurred when the 
Canadian contingent for the United Nations Emergency 
Force was rejected by the Egyptians. They apparently 
were perplexed as to the reason why the Queen's Own 
Rifles were replacing the Queen's own troops in Suez. 
As Pearson has noted, however, the Queen's Own Rifles 
were the only choice because: 
"it appeared that our only alternative to 
the regiment in question was The Black 
Watch! What we needed was the First East 
Kootenay Anti-imperialistic Rifles."(41) 
The significance of the Suez crisis for unification 
was that, firstly, the identification of the Queens Own 
Rifles as 'British' troops by the Egyptians was 
humiliating to Pearson, under whose administration 
unification eventually came about. As Galloway has 
(39) Eayrs, James Canada in World Affairs October 1955 
to June 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1961) 
"p. 1^4. 
(40) Ibid, p. 185. 
(41) Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt.Hon. 
Lester B. Pearson, 1948-19^1 (Toronto: New American 
Library of Canada, 1973) Vol. 2, p. 296. 
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observed: 
"Lester Pearson's offer was rejected, 
and in this rejection was born the 
idea of a need for a Canadian military 
machine which would be unmistakingly 
Canadian."(42) 
Secondly, Suez signalled the end of the anachronistic 
concept of 'colonial troops' as Canada sought to define 
her own defence priorities, that is: 
"the Pearson vision of a highly mobile 
group of Canadian peacekeepers cracking 
around the world like Superman."(43) 
Thirdly, Suez demonstrated that if Canada was to have 
such a highly mobile force, the three services could not 
hope to accomplish the task.(44) Furthermore, it has 
been argued by Richard Ross that indeed the desire for 
a highly mobile force was Hellyer*s fundamental intent 
in unification as well as rendering the forces less 
likely to be 'appendaged' by the British.(45) 
(d) The Glassco Commission 
The Glassco Commission was the catalyst for the 
reorganization of the Canadian forces. It revealed, in 
(42) Galloway, Strom. "The Search for a Defence Policy 
in Canada", in Army Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 5, 
(Devon: West of London Press, 1971). p. 289. 
(43) Ibid, p. 290. 
(44) Ibid, p. 290-
(45) Ross, Richard. A Paradigm in Defence Organization: 
Unification of tine Canadian Armed "Forces, (Fort Lee: 
U.S. Army Logistics Management Centre, 1969). 
pp. 21-27. 
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addition to a reappraisal of Canada*s defence 
committments, three areas of concern, (a)the ratio of 
manpower to equipment purchases, (b)the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, and (c)civilian control over the services. 
Consequently, it provided for the forthcoming White 
Paper on Defence under the directorship of Paul Hellyer, 
Minister of National Defence. 
For several years prior to 1963, Canada had been 
able to maintain a virtual ceiling on defence expenditures, 
however, this had been accomplished through the adjustment 
of manpower to equipment purchases. It was observed that 
if this trend continued, by the late 1960*s all of the 
defence budget would be absorbed by manpower costs alone. 
As Air Marshal Sharp pointed out: 
"Unless something was done we would price 
ourselves out of existence."(46) 
The Glassco Commission therefore sought to reduce 
expenditures in manpower. It was recognized that since 
Canadian defence committments were linked operationally 
to collective security measures, and would hence be under 
control of these commands (SACLANT, SACEUR, NATO), the 
situation would be that: 
"the principal function of the headquarters 
organization...(would be) one of support 
(46) Gellner, J. "Service Unification in Canada" 
op. cit. p. 4. 
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rather than operational command; to 
direct and regulate the manning, 
training, arming, supplying and 
accomodating the Armed Forces."(47) 
While the commissioners recognized that the forms of 
support activity would vary among the services, they 
also realized that the growth of technology common to 
all three services made division among support services 
redundant.(4^) In research and development also, the 
commissioners reported that: 
"In this area, as in many others, the 
traditional independence of the three 
services gives rise to duplication 
and waste."(49) 
The Glassco Commission found serious fault with 
the organization of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CS.C.) 
and with the severely circumscribed role of its 
Chairman (C£QS>). The CS.C. was governed by unanimous 
decision since proposals were not voted upon, nor did 
the C.C.O.S. have any overriding authority. Hence: 
"the effectiveness of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee is, to a large extent, 
dependent on the personal qualities of 
its members, each of whom has a virtual 
veto in its deliberations."(50) 
Decision-making was further complicated by the fact there 
already existed 200 standing tri-service committees and 
(47) Glassco Commission Vol. 4, January 21, 1963. p. 66. 
48 Ibid, p. 66. 
(49) TEia. pp. 67-68. 
(50) Ibid, p. 70. 
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approximately 400 committees of a temporary, task-
oriented nature. The Glassco Commission quite correctly 
stated that the committee system : 
"permits procrastination, and the absence 
of a single commanding voice may spell 
the difference between success or 
failure in any matter of joint concern 
to the three services."(51) 
In reference to the C.C.O.S., the commissioners 
recognized that if executive authority were placed 
squarely on the shoulders of the C.C.O.S., there was the 
possibility of * excessive concentration* of authority 
within his advisory task. , This could have had 
dangerous implications in light of the C.C.0.S.*s 
responsibility as the Canadian representative to N.A.T.O., 
as chairman of the Ranks Structure Committee, and as a 
member of the Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence and 
the Cabinet Defence Committee. Nonetheless, the C.C.0.S.*s 
lack of authority was viewed as an explicit liability in 
his functions pertaining to the coordination of training 
and operations conducted by the services. 
Under such conditions, each service chief was 
responsible for the control and administration of his 
service branch; thus, the C.C.0.S.*s only resort was his 
persuasiveness with the service chief involved or, 
failing this, his influence with the Minister.(52) 
(51) Ibid, p. 70. 
(52) Ibid, p. 73. 
- 41 -
The third aspect of the commissioners study to 
be found wanting, was in relationship to the role of 
the Deputy Minister and the extent of civilian control. 
While a Minister*s powers enable him to delegate 
whatever authority to his Deputy as he may desire, 
established practice, since the Deputy is not accountable 
to the House, is that the Deputy Minister*s will * affect' 
the carrying through of established policy, during the 
course of which he may exercise his discretion. This 
meant that the Deputy Minister*s role in policy 
development was very limited by virtue of the fact that 
necessary manpower was not available to adequately assess 
proposals submitted to his office. The Glassco Commission 
concluded that the role of the Deputy Minister be 
expanded, so as to assist the Minister and participate 
more actively in the administration of the armed forces. 
As indicated by the Glassco Commission, the absence of 
such civilian advice imperilled civilian control. 
"The Minister may rely primarily on the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee for advice 
and on questions of military effectiveness 
it is natural that he should do so; but 
the military character of this group 
raises doubts as to the reality of civilian 
control if the minister places excessive 
reliance upon it. 
There is a need for a strong staff 
group which is essentially civilian in 
character, outside the framework of 
management of the Armed Forces."(53) 
(53) Ibid.
 p. 76. 
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Because of the sprawling complexity of 
administration and the plethora of committees within 
the Ministry, the Glassco Commission also noted that 
the multiplicity of channels to the Minister meant that 
it was an extraordinarily difficult task to exercise 
effective control over the services. It was therefore 
implicit in the commissioner's recommendations that 
an essentially civilian organization, through the 
Deputy Minister's office, be available to ensure such 
control over administration policy. 
/ 
/Undoubtedly, the growth of nationalism and the 
concommitant rejection of colonial fiats, the imbalance 
between manpower and equipment costs, the multifarious 
organizational iniquities of the tri-service system 
and the necessity for operational efficacy, were all 
contributory justifications for the reorganization of 
the Department of National Defence; but were they 
sufficient justification to proceed with unification? 
Operational efficacy, while it was argued that unification 
was the irrevocable corollary to integration, may well 
have suffered because of the schism produced between the 
military and the civilian authority. The high cost of 
manpower relative to the resources available for new 
equipment could have been adumbrated through more 
stringent procurement and accounting procedures or by 
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further attempts at logistics integration.(54) The 
nationalist aspect, could surely have been appeased 
by far less controversial measures, perhaps by 
emphasizing the realignment of defence priorities and 
the global peacekeeper role. The Glassco Commission*s 
findings, provided not so much a rationale for 
unification as they did for integration. The 
commissioners had indeed explicitly rejected unification 
because of the diversity of operational roles.(55) If 
such explanations are unsatisfactory, what then, of 
civilian control? 
(5) Civilian Control as a Concept 
When analyzing civil-military relations in a 
nation having strong, democratic institutions such as 
Canada, surrealistic images of despotic military juntas 
can be dispensed with; civilian control over the military 
is not described in terms of a threat to constitutional 
authority. As Michael Howard has pointed out, in a both 
(54) Paul Hellyer stresses that because of the lack of 
executive authority in the CS.C. and because of 
the multiplicity of channels to the Minister, the 
Chiefs of Staff would refuse to make priority 
judgments. Interview with Mr. Hellyer OJD. cit. 
August 29, 1975. 
(55) Glassco Commission, op_0 cit. p. 64. 
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•orderly and peaceful* society: 
"military leaders are no longer suspected 
of nurturing Caesarist ambitions. 
Indeed, the armed forces constitute only 
a part of the national organization for 
defence and are entirely dependent upon 
the civil, industrial and scientific 
organization for their power."(56) 
Furthermore, Howard argues that the degree of empathy 
between the civilian and military authority is dependent 
not upon the acquisition of power, but rather upon 
priorities defined in terms of resource management.(57) 
Howard*s contention is an obvious one; the 
accelerating costs of increasingly sophisticated weapons 
technology and the expansion of the defence budget 
relative to the Gross National Product, result in 
competition with civilians for resource allocations. 
This competition for resources (particularly in 
the United States) contributes substantially to the 
character of civil-military relations. Howard*s thesis 
however, is so readily apparent that it becomes axiomatic, 
and consequently does not offer a sufficient explanation 
of the exigencies of civilian control over the military. 
Civilian control does not refer merely to the potential 
for the usurpation of democratic processes nor to th.e' 
avaricious consumption of resources. 
(56) Howard, M. (ed) "The Armed Forces as a Political 
Problem", in Soldiers and Governments (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1957). p. 16 . 
(57) Ibid, p. 13. 
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Samuel Huntington*s analysis of civilian 
control is more fruitful; he suggests that military 
policy is comprised of three elements: military security 
(external threat); internal security (subversion); 
situational security (long range estimation of economic, 
social and demographic changes potentially damaging to 
the state). Each policy type has both an operational 
and institutional component. The operational element he 
describes as pertaining to the size, organization and 
utilization of the armed forces,while at the same time 
being responsible for the resources required for military 
purposes.(58) Operations* policy then, upon which 
Howard had concentrated his attention, consists "of the 
immediate means taken to meet the security threat,"(59) 
whereas * institutional policy* deals with the manner in 
which operational policy is formulated and executed.(60) 
The * institutional* element then, becomes of paramount 
importance, for while, as Huntington states, public 
debate usually emphasizes the *operational* aspect: "in 
the long run the nature of the decision on these issues is 
determined by the institutional pattern through which 
the decisions are made."(61) / 
(58) Huntington, Samuel. The Soldier and the State 
(New York: Viritage Books, 1964). p. 3. 
(59) Ibid. p. 1. 
(60) Ibid.
 p. 1. 
(61) Ibid, p. 2. 
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Huntington*s study was predicated on his 
insistence that ideally, civil-military relations be 
constructed so as to allow for the maximization of 
security without jeopardizing prevalent social values. 
He is thus arguing for what he has termed *objective 
civilian control* through permitting optimal military 
professionalism,while restraining * subjective civilian 
control*, or the *civilianizing* of the military.(62) 
In brief, he stated that the: 
"essence of objective civilian control is 
the recognition of an autonomous military 
professionalism; the essence of subjective 
civilian control is the denial of an 
independent military sphere. Historically 
the demand for objective control has come 
from the military profession, the demand 
for subjective control from the multifarious 
civilian groups anxious to maximize their 
power in military affairs."(63) 
Huntington*s argument does not suggest the 
desirability of the military clamouring for political 
participation, rather he argues that the more professional 
the military becomes, that is, the greater their autonomy, 
their credibility as a political force is dissipated 
because they would have been neutralized. Subjective 
civilian control conversely, would presuppose a conflict 
of interest between civilian authority and military 
security resulting in a situation where the prerequisites 
C62) Ibid, pp. 80-85-
(63) Ibid, pp. 83-84. 
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of military security are deemed to erode civilian 
control.(64) Thus Huntington, both in his attitude 
towards unification (which was entirely negative) and 
in his preferences for an 'autonomous military sphere*, 
has underlined his pluralist conception of policy-making 
and the military establishments role in it. 
(6) Civilian Control and the Armed Forces in Canada 
In Canada, however, successive goverments have 
been reluctant to allow for such an autonomous military 
prerogative; in fact, the Canadian military has repeatedly 
paid homage, at least verbally, to the sacrosanct tenets 
of civilian supremacy. Air Vice Marshal M.M. Hendrick 
has stated that: 
"We are by tradition an anonymous group... 
It was not our business to worry about 
politics; we left that to our Minister, 
and to our civilian heads. We also had a 
feeling...of confidence that our judgments, 
our advice and our technical know-how would 
be given due consideration by our political 
masters... 
If it was overruled...it was for reasons of 
economy, economics, politics, strategy or 
some other overriding reason for which the 
military factors had to be subordinated. 
Of course, none of us would take any quarrel 
with this whatever."(65) 
The seeming acquiescence of the military to the concept of 
civilian supremacy has led some defence commentators, 
(64) Ibid, pp. 83-84. 
(65) Byers, R. ojo. cit. pp. 3-4. 
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* 
such as James Eayrs, to conclude that the;"principle 
of civilian supremacy has been firmly built into the 
institutions of which post-war defence policy is 
made."(66) Roddick Byers notes that: 
"it has generally been accepted that a 
fairly high degree of civilian control 
operated in Canada. Furthermore, the 
prevailing pattern of civilian-military 
relations seemed to approximate the 
anti-military ideology, low political 
powers,and high military professionalism 
ideal type suggested by S. Huntington."(67) 
The ostensibly halcyon days of civil-military 
relations in Canada however, were periodically shattered 
when the military exceeded its jurisdiction in the 
determination and carrying-out of defence policy. Such 
events could occur because governments, while exercising 
civilian control defined in terms of institutional 
supremacy, did not sufficiently undertake civilian 
direction except on those occasions when they sought to 
retrieve their authority after the military had 
exceeded theirs. 
Civilian control therefore has two aspects: L-
(a) the government as final arbiter of defence policy, and 
(b) as active participant in the military establishment. 
As Professor Byers has stated*, "without some civilian 
direction, the degree of control is bound to suffer."(68) 
(66) Ibid. p. 1. 
(67) Ibid, p. 10. 
(68) Ibid, p. 5. 
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During the Second World War, the established 
practices of Canadian civil-military relations were 
demonstrably at odds with those of the Americans. As 
James Eayrs has emphasized, the American military was 
largely responsible for the conduct of their own policy 
and strategy, whereas, in Canada, Mackenzie King was 
inexorably absorbed in the Canadian war effort.(69) 
Although Mackenzie King was confident in General 
MacNaughton*s military capabilities, General MacNaughton's 
discretionary powers were nonetheless limited by the 
Prime Minister. Mackenzie King was most indignant when 
informed that General MacNaughton had committed troops 
to take part in a British operation in Norway without his 
prior consultation or consent. During the preparations 
for Operation Husky in the Italian campaign, Mackenzie 
King's decision to send troops was due in part to his 
concern that unless Canada participated directly in the 
campaign, the nation would have less influence in post-war 
deliberations.(70) 
A striking example of the differences between the 
Canadian and American civil-military relations occurred 
when the Americans requested Canadian troops for an assault 
upon Japanese positions in the Aleutian Islands. U.S. 
(69) Eayrs, James. The Art of the Possible (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1961) pp. 75-76. 
(70) Ibid, pp. 81-82. 
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General DeWitt approached Major General Pearkes 
(later destined to be Defence Minister under Mr. 
Diefenbaker) as to the possibility of Canadian 
assistance. General Pearkes 'did not report this 
discussion to the Prime Minister. Later General Pope 
(Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in 
Washington) discussed the proposal with U.S. Secretary 
Hickerson. General Pope then raised the issue with 
Lieutenant-General Stuart who advised him to contact 
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C Marshall. 
Subsequently, General Marshall dispatched General DeWitt 
to confer with General Pearkes as to the necessary 
arrangements for the invasion. All of this was carried 
out by General Pearkes without communicating his 
intentions to the Prime Minister. This then, was a 
conspicuous violation of established practice. General 
Pearkes was particularly adroit in this regard(71) and 
before Mackenzie King knew what was happening, Pearkes 
had not only agreed to the proposal but had already 
despatched troops to the Aleutians.(72) 
Mackenzie King was furious that Canada was 
involved in any military operation with the United States 
without his consent. He insisted that any such involvement 
(71) During the interview with Mr. Paul Hellyer he 
claimed to be unaware of the Aleutian incident. 
Hellyer Interview op_. cit. 
(72) Eayrs, James. op_. cit. p. 94. 
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must be preceded by overtures from the State Department 
to himself, the War Committee of Cabinet, and the 
Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralston. 
General Pope was then- sent to see Mr. Hickerson 
to express the Prime Minister's criticism of the way 
the military had proceeded. Upon his arrival in 
Washington, General Pope was promptly informed that if: 
"Canada wanted a Stimson to Ralston 
invitation to collaborate...(Pope 
should) forget whatever Calvinistic 
tendencies there might be in (the 
Canadian) system and not set out in 
an attempt to reform U.S. Army 
procedure."(73) 
v Such incidents as those in Italy and the Aleutians 
serve to indicate the greater degree of supervision 
actively undertaken by the Canadian government in the 
conduct of military operations. Yet another crisis 
arose which was of even greater political significance. 
Mackenzie King had always regarded the conscription 
issue with some trepidation, because of the strongly 
anti-conscriptionist mood of Quebec. The rate of 
attrition in Europe however, meant that voluntary 
enlistment would no longer sustain the strength of the 
forces required. This led to a breach of confidence, 
between the government and the military officers, during 
which General Pearkes was again to become a central figure. 
(73) Ibid. pp. 84-85. 
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Upon learning that Mackenzie King fully 
intended to continue with volunteer recruits rather 
than conscription, General Pearkes attempted to pressure 
the government, releasing his' opinions to the press. 
Mackenzie King warned that: 
"That looks like the Army against the 
civil power. These men in uniform 
have no right to speak in ways which 
will turn the people against civil 
power."(74) 
Shortly thereafter, several senior officers delivered 
a memorandum to General MacNaughton, now the Minister 
of National Defence, declaring that voluntary 
recruitment was insufficient. In effect, this was an 
ultimatum to the government, that unless conscription 
was immediately set in motion, mass resignations would 
occur among the Army High Command. In the face of such 
desparate events as having the resignation of officers 
during wartime, Mackenzie King yielded to military 
pressure and conscription began.(75) 
(7) Summary 
The implications of such instances of civil-
military conflict were firstly, during the course of war 
operations the military had exceeded their discretionary 
powers, whereas during the Aleutian Islands issue, the 
(74) Ibid, p. 93. 
(75) Ibid. p. 94. 
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military had entered into defence agreements without 
(^  the prior consultation with the government. During 
conscription, the military had premeditatedly sought 
to impose their will upon the'civilian authority. 
Dangerous precedents indeed, at the threshold of the 
nuclear era. 
In the years following the war, the destructive 
capabilities of nuclear weapons and the subsequent 
introduction of long range delivery systems, coupled 
with the cold war and the realignment of collective 
defence measures meant that in future the distinction 
between military and civilian strategic decisions could 
not be so clearly differentiated. As Eayrs has pointed 
out: 
"The result in Canada, as in all Western 
nations, was to compel senior military 
officers to exercise judgment in areas 
far beyond their traditional competence."(76) 
Interestingly enough, Eayrs remains convinced as 
to the reality of civilian control and argues his case by 
means of illustrating the extent of civilian membership 
within the defence establishment. To support his view 
he cites the composition of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee; this would include the Deputy Minister for 
National Defence, the Chiefs of Staff, the Under-Secretary 
of State for External Affairs, a member of the Defence 
(76> Ibid. P. 94. 
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Research Board, and periodically, the attendance of 
External Affairs people on the Joint Intelligence 
Committee and the Joint Planning Committee. Eayrs 
incorrectly assumes that such, a 'body-count* of 
civilians would illustrate adequate civilian control. 
It was however, precisely the composition of the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee and the effectiveness of the Deputy 
Minister*s role which caused such grave concern to the 
Glassco Commission as to the reality of civilian control. 
Furthermore, despite the civilian membership within the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was the military*s 
influence which had prevented the European members of 
N.A.T.O. from participation along northern radar 
positions,(77) and General Foulkes, who as Chairman of 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was instrumental in 
'stampeding* Canada into NORAD. 
Despite Professor Eayrs assurances to the 
contrary, the extent of civilian control over the military 
cannot be determined merely by a cursory enumeration of 
participants. What is required is that those participants 
v have sufficient capability, through access to civilian 
v 
sources of policy advice, to evaluate the proposals 
before them so as to provide not only civilian control but 
also direction over defence policy. 
(77) Ibid, p. 97-
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The implications of this chapter are that 
(a) policy outputs are not necessarily dependent 
variables differentiated only by subject matter, 
(b) policy both affects and is effected by policy-
making apparatus itself, (c) policy effects the 
structuring of influence within the policy-making 
process. With reference to defence, there existed a 
demonstrable need for the assertion of civilian control, 
that is, for a restructuring of influence, which 
integration, while ameliorating the substantive issues, 
could not accomplish. Only through unification, with 
he imposition upon the military of an authoritative, 
Minified central hierarchy having expanded sources of 
civilian input, could the civilian authority ensure 
civilian control and direction of the armed forces. 
The following chapter, utilizing Doern and 
Aucoin*s typology of policy-making, explores the 
relationship between the policy-making process and the 
determination of defence policy during Mr. Diefenbaker*s 
term of office. The research suggests that the sterility 
of the policy-making apparatus, that is, the absence of 
civilian input into defence issues coupled with the 
Prime Minister's reluctance to develop long-range policy 
objectives, undoubtedly led to the defence debacle in 
which Mr. Diefenbaker found himself. 
/ 
v. 
&> 
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Chapter II: The Diefenbaker Period: 
Incrementalist Policy Inputs 
As G. Bruce Doern has stated, the roles of policy-
making organizations, "are derived from the logic of 
their functional input into policy"(l); the same 
criterion applies tothe utilization of other policy 
inputs such as royal commissions, White Papers, task 
forces, and advisory councils. As noted earlier, the 
expansion and differentiation of policy-making organizations; 
"has transformed the central machinery from a fused, 
personalized and primarily passive instrument of policy 
development to that of a relatively more differentiated 
bureaucratized and active one."(2) In essence, the 
characterization of policy-making organizations within 
the Diefenbaker government as * fused, personalized and 
passive*, means that innovative, programme-output oriented 
policy did not develop and as a consequence policy was 
determined incrementally. This condition was evident not 
only at the executive level, but was also descriptive of 
the uses to which additional forms of policy inputs were 
applied, such as royal commissions. 
The implications for defence policy were of great 
(1) Doern, G.Bruce "Policy Organizations in the 
Executive Arena", G. Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin 
op. cit. p. 41* 
(2) Ibid, pp. 41-42. 
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significance as well because such an incrementalist 
approach, in the absence of definitive, innovative policy 
resulted in Diefenbaker being unable to cope with the 
pressing issues of defence. His vacillation on the 
matter of acquiring nuclear armaments led to the 
collapse of his government. Such defence policy 
quandaries however, were not endemic solely to the 
Conservatives, rather they were, as John McLin has argued, 
inherited from the Liberals. Mr. Diefenbaker therefore 
is not entirely culpable for creating such critical 
issues for defence policy as he was for his inability 
to make significant departures from on-going policy.(3) 
Not surprisingly, the absence of sources of 
policy initiative, coupled with an incrementalist and 
•redistributive* policy orientation could, and in fact, 
did result, in the military exercizing excessive 
influence in the determination of defence policy. This 
was accomplished largely through the efforts of General 
Pearkes, Minister of National Defence and General Foulkes, 
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who embarked 
upon policy initiatives clearly beyond their jurisdiction 
due the absence of adequate civilian direction. 
(3) Doern, B. Bruce and Aucoin, P. op_. cit. p. 7. 
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(1) The Machinery of Policy 
As a policy-maker, Diefenbaker sought to 
identify himself in the mould of a contemporary 
MacDonald, reconciling disparate regional groups and 
fending off the encroachments of Bay Street and 
bureaucrats in the civil service. As a result, 
communications between executive and the civil service 
ground to a halt and the Prime Minister gathered around 
himself not skilled administrators but instead, as 
Newman has described, a "feckless crew of political 
hangers on"(4) whose sole purpose was to indulge the 
Prime Minister*s political aspirations. 
Policy-making was reduced to a * brokerage 
incrementalism*(5) as a reaction to the G.N.P. approach 
of the Liberals. Redistributive policy was the order 
of the day as Mr. Diefenbaker: 
"tried to appropriate to himself the cry 
from every underdeveloped sector of the 
country*s population, a cry not for 
charity or special privleges, but for 
an equalization of opportunity within 
the Canadian Confederation."(o) 
(4) Newman, P.C. Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker 
Years, (Toronto: McClelland and Stuart, 1963). p. 
(5) Doern, G. Bruce. "Policy Organizations in the 
Executive Arena" p_£. cit. p. 45. 
(6) Newman, P.C op_. cit. p. 190. 
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When questioned as to his opinion of the Glassco 
Commission*s recommendations, he retorted;"That*s 
wrong. We*re not running the government like a big 
business corporation."(7) Policy outputs then, were 
not programmes but rather government handouts designed 
to cultivate electoral support.(8) 
As indicated earlier, the policy input of the 
P.M.O. and the P.CO. were relatively benign, 
preoccupied as they were with housekeeping under the 
tutelage of the * chief*. Newman states flatly that the 
Cabinet was "a mixture of patriotic radicals and 
weak-kneed reactionaries,"(9) and "waiters on Providence, 
men who shared his tastes and prejudices, but not his 
breadth of outlook or patriotic zeal."(10) There were 
of course exceptions, notably Davie Fulton and Donald 
Fleming, but Fulton as Minister of Justice resigned 
when it became clear to him that Mr. Diefenbaker was 
much more adept at chastizing the Liberals rather than 
developing concrete policy objectives. The final blow 
came when Mr. Diefenbaker reversed his position in the 
Columbia River Treaty.(11) Fleming, as Minister of 
Finance, vainly attempted to balance the budget amidst 
(7) Ibid, p. 193. 
(8) Doern, G. Bruce "Policy Organizations in the 
Executive Arena". op_. cit. p. 45. 
(9) Newman, p.C oj>. cit. p. 92. 
(10) Ibid, p. 97. 
(11) Ibid, pp. 118-120. 
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the overtly political spending of his peers. He was 
often not even informed of forthcoming important 
expenditures and was frequently overruled in 
Cabinet.(12) The plight of Fleming and Fulton was the 
rule rather than the exception; in Cabinet, Mr. 
Diefenbaker: 
"acted as if he were the silent 
partner in every cabinet minister*s 
office. He ignored the normal 
delegation of authority and attempted 
to operate the federal adminis tration 
through personal prerogative."(13) 
Consequently, the potential for policy inputs were 
sharply curtailed, with the Prime Minister regarding 
expert opinion as incursions into the sanctuary of his 
office. 
In matters of finance, the Treasury Board was 
directly under the auspices of the Department of 
Finance, there was no appreciable differentiation of 
roles. If, as Doern suggests, the classical budgetary 
system was control-oriented and concerned with the 
overall effects of government spending,(14) this 
characteristic was even more acute under Fleming because 
he approached the budget as a clerk, rejecting the 
Keynesian thesis and failing to comprehend how the 
(12) Ibid, p. 92. 
(13) Ibid. p. 92. 
(14) Doern, G. Bruce. "The Budgetary Process and the 
Policy Role of the Federal Bureaucracy" in 
G. Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. pp. 80-81. 
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economy could be manipulated or stimulated through 
government taxation and spending.(15) As Doern points 
out, the classical budgetary process meant that "future 
policies and budgets became mere linear extensions of 
the past",(16) devoid of either outputs or programmes 
which were anything but incrementally derived handouts. 
This was of course of critical importance during debates 
over the A.V. Roe Arrow. 
Significantly, other sources of policy input, 
apart from those at the executive level, were also of 
limited impact. White Papers, which had already 
demonstrated their utility in Britain by 1945 for 
testing Parliamentary opinion, were used in Canada 
primarily as an information tool, that is, they were 
used to provide information on government policy which 
had already been established, rather than for policy 
development. The roles of White Papers were changed 
considerably during Pearson*s tenure as a means to 
facilitate discussion on future policy.(17) 
The extensive use of"Royal Commissions'^ sixteen 
in all) by the Diefenbaker government can be attributed 
to a variety of reasons, not the least of which may be. 
that they were instituted because the government had 
no policy of its own. The use of "royal commissions"in 
(15) Newman, P.C. p_p_. cit. pp. 125-27. 
(16) Doern, G.B. in "The Budgetary Process and the Policy 
Role of the Federal Bureaucracy". op_. cit. p. 83. 
(17) Doern, A.D., "The Role of White PapersrrT~in G. Bruce 
Doern and P. Aucoin OJD. cit. pp. 180-L82. 
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such diverse areas of public policy as taxation, health, 
energy, and government organization indicated the very 
weakness of the government policy-making apparatus.(18) 
In addition, as Wilson has stated, the "Royal Commissions" 
were not only a policy input but an output as well, 
because they illustrated the government*s concern with 
a particular policy area as well as being a means of 
buying time.(19) 
The roles of advisory councils such as the 
National Research Council and the Medical Research 
Council, were also circumscribed in terms of policy 
input because they were not centrally integrated into 
the policy process. Such councils were not only advisory, 
but they carried functional programmes whose investigations 
are reported to the Cabinet through the ministers of 
the appropriate department; therefore, their findings 
were not only *allocative*, but *positional* in that they 
must compete with other such councils for resources. 
While these councils operate within several departments, 
they do not interfere in specific research and are 
subject to the whims of the pet projects of particular 
departments. Consequently, as discerned by the Glassco 
(18) Doern, G. Bruce, "Policy Organization in the 
Executive Arena", op_. cit. p. 46. 
(19) Wilson, S.V. "The Role of Royal Commissions and 
Task Forces," in G. Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin, 
op. cit. pp. 113-113. 
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Commission, the councils did not fulfill their 
intended purpose of advising the government on broad 
research questions and instead focused on regulating 
its own affairs and becoming enmeshed with departmental 
projects. 
Although the failure of the councils could be 
as easily attributed to the nature of their activities 
or their personnel, this was but another instance of 
the Diefenbaker government failing to use potential 
policy input by leaving the councils decentralized, 
self-regulating and autonomous.(20) 
In conclusion then, the Diefenbaker government, 
through its preoccupation with electoral prowess, 
failed to utilize or did not comprehend the machinery 
of public policy whether at the executive level, 
government sponsored White Papers and'Royal Commissions," 
or advisory councils comprised largely of non-governmental 
personnel. Policy was therefore nothing but a succession 
of electioneering hand-outs, reaction and brokerage-
incrementalism bereft of planning or insight. 
2. Defence Policy 
Since Diefenbaker had insulated- himself from 
conventional sources of policy inputs, he relied upon 
(20) Aucoin, P. "The Role of Functional Advisory 
Councils", in G. Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin, 
pp. cit. p. 154-160. 
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his political friends; in matters of defence policy, 
his advisor was Major-General George Pearkes, Minister 
of National Defence. General Pearkes was a consistent 
supporter and friend of Diefenbaker; in the 1948 Tory 
leadership convention, Pearkes nominated Diefenbaker 
for party leader declaring, "It is the prayer of the 
common people of this land that John Diefenbaker be 
their leader."(21) Again in 1956, Pearkes nominated 
Diefenbaker stating that he;"was the greatest living 
Canadian - a cross between Simon de Montfort and 
Benjamin Disraeli."(22) General Pearkes was a holder 
of the Victoria Cross, and the Conservative defence 
critic during St. Laurent*s government. He had also 
distinguished himself however, through his role in the 
somewhat unsavoury incidents pertaining to civilian 
control during and after the war. Pearkes, in 
conjunction with General Foulkes, was to have profound 
influence upon the determination of Mr. Diefenbaker*s 
defence policy, the implications of which were to be 
felt a few years hence during the unification debates. 
In fairness to Mr. Diefenbaker, the issues of 
defence, N.O.R.A.D., N.A.T.O., the Arrow and the Cuban 
missile crisis, were not entirely his responsibility; 
(21) Newman, P.C, op_. cit. p. 28. 
(22) Ibid, p. 46. 
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doubtless they were compounded by his inept response 
to such issues, but the cost of sophisticated 
weaponry, Soviet developments in I.CB.M.'s, the 
confrontation between Kennedy and Krushchev, were 
clearly external to his capability and responsibility.(23) 
In addition, many defence issues arose during previous 
Liberal administrations which were shelved pending the 
outcome of an election. Many tentative agreements had 
already been initiated when the Conservatives took 
office and in fact criticism often centred not upon the 
issues themselves but upon Diefenbaker*s method, or lack 
of it, in resolving them. 
It is doubtlessly true that Canadian defence 
policy since the last war has been predicated upcn 
collective defence, acting in concert with Canada's 
allies. To this end, Canada was engaged in a number of 
collective defence measures aimed at co-operation with 
the U.S. Informal agreements were drawn up for Canada 
and the U.S. to exchange intelligence, weapons and 
research developments. Plans provided for joint naval 
exercises, L.O.R.A.N, navigation stations, the Pinetree 
Line, McGill Fence, and the Distant Early Warning Line 
(DEW) to detect Soviet aircraft penetration of northern 
(23) McLin, Jon B. Canada.'s Changing Defence Policy 
1957-1963. The Problems of a Middle Power in 
Alliance, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1967). pp. 7-3. 
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defences tsuch devices were to protect the Strategic 
Air Command (SAC) rather than Canadian soil). The 
principles of co-operation in this bilateral defence 
effort however, were emphatic that Canada retain control 
of U.S. bases in Canada.(24) 
At the same time, Canadians were becoming 
increasingly concerned about the dependence of Canada's 
defences upon U.S. strategy and requirements, and thus 
welcomed participation in ll.A.T.O. as a means to . 
offset U.S. influence. Canada was, according to McLin, 
particularly enthusiastic for the opportunity to 
purchase influence through contribution to European 
defence. Such commitments involved one infantry 
brigade and twelve squadrons of interceptors which were 
to be brought home after European military strength was 
less fragile. Concern was also expressed, especially 
by Lester Pearson, as to the extent of consultation 
which would occur between the U.S. and her allies in 
the event of an emergency. Pearson warned against 
'entrenched continentalism*(25). Such issues however, 
were left unresolved until after the election. 
(3) N.O.R.A.D. 
In response to already existing joint co-operation 
(24) Ibid, p. 28. 
(25) Ibid, p. 25. 
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between Canada and the U.S., in 1956 a joint U.S.-
Canadian study group began to examine the feasibility 
of joint command in continental defence. The U.S. 
Chiefs of Staff were anxious to pursue the recommend-
ations of the study group thatajoint headquarters for 
air defence be established. Ralph Campney, Minister 
of National Defence in the St. Laurent government, 
urged the Cabinet Defence Committee to agree with the 
recommendations of the study group; however, Campney 
later informed the U.S. Joint Chiefs that the decision 
would be delayed pending the June election, which the 
Liberals were confident of winning. After the Liberals 
were defeated, Lester Pearson denied that the Cabinet 
Defence Committee, or the Cabinet, had given consent to 
the agreement, however, it was revealed that in fact 
External Affairs had been engaged in negotiations for 
two years and the military aspects had already been 
worked out by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
General Foulkes, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, approached General George Pearkes to 
expedite the government approval of the N.O.R.A.D. 
agreement. General Pearkes was then able to convince 
Mr. Diefenbaker, who was acting as his own Minister for 
External Affairs, to express his consent to the agreement 
when U.S. Secretary .of State Dulles arrived in Ottawa. 
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Five days after this meeting, General Pearkes 
announced the N.O.R.A.D. agreement.(26) 
The substantive agreements of N.O.R.A.D. were 
not, at this time, at issue; Diefenbaker acted solely 
on the advice of Pearkes and Foulkes, and gave his 
verbal assurances to Dulles without consulting the 
Cabinet, External Affairs, or the Cabinet Defence 
Committee.(27) His failure to do so was later confirmed 
by Sidney Smith, whom Diefenbaker had placed as head 
of External Affairs. General Foulkes, in his testimony 
before the Special Committee on Defence stated; 
"Unfortunately - I am afraid - we stampeded the incoming 
government with the N.O.R.A.D. agreement."(28) As McLin 
states: 
"It seems highly probable...that neither 
the Cabinet Defence Committee not- the 
full Cabinet was the agency of decision; 
the implementation of the agreement 
preceded not only its discussion by 
Parliament but antedated by some eight 
(26) Ibid, pp. 40-41. 
(27) Newman, P.C. pp. cit. p. 347. 
(28) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on 
Defence, 1963, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1963). Testimony 
of General Foulkes, p. 510. Hereafter referred to 
as General Foulkes testimony. General Foulkes also 
testified that the N.O.R.A.D. decision was taken in 
the absence of.the Cabinet Defence Committee 
because at that point, August 1957, no such Committee 
had been set up. "The Minister of National Defence 
took the paper and got it approved. I have no 
knowledge and if I had - it would hot be wise to 
reveal it - whether it went to the Cabinet or not. 
p. 527. 
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months the signature of a formal 
agreement between governments."(29) 
Although Pearson chastized the government for 
its flagrant disregard for procedure in failing to 
bring the agreement before Parliament,(30) the N.O.R.A.D. 
agreement also came under scrutiny concerning command 
relationships, consultation, and the relationship 
between N.O.R.A.D. and N.A.T.O. Despite Diefenbaker's 
attempts to describe joint command, that is, operational 
command in the event of an emergency, as 'operational 
control' to placate his critics,(31) it was obvious 
that unless the commander of N.O.R.A.D. had the 
authority to use Canadian forces, N.O.R.A.D. would have 
been a sterile agreement. 'Consultation' created some 
trepidation among Opposition critics who feared that 
Canada might suddenly be involved in an American war.(32) 
In fact, consultation was to be an on-going process with 
formal lines of communication presumably so that 
Canada would not be caught unawares. On the matter of 
N.A.T.O./N.O.R.A.D. relations, the government, for 
overtly political purposes, sought to leave the 
impression that they were interdependent. This, however, 
(29) McLin, J.B., op_. cit. p. 49. 
(30) Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa: Queens 
Printer). June 10, 1958, Vol. I, pp. 1000-1004. 
Hereafter referred to as Debates 
(3D Ibid, pp. 995-996. 
(32) McLin, J.B., op. cit, p. 51. 
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was completely erroneous.(33) 
(4) The AVRO-Arrow Issue 
The debates over the AVRO-Arrow focused upon 
the objectives of defence policy, which the Diefenbaker 
government was most ambivalent on. 
The Arrow was an all-weather interceptor, 
capable of speeds of Mach Two, designed to counter 
anticipated Soviet turbo-jet bomber aircraft.(34) The 
initial proposal of the service chiefs was that the 
airframe be developed in Canada, with the engine, fire 
control system, and weapons systems to be purchased 
elsewhere. It was hoped that the Arrow, with the 
requisite equipment, would have a production run of 
close to six hundred, at a cost under $2 million each. 
Although the A.V. Roe Company originally intended to 
use Rolls-Royce engines, or the U.S. Wright engines, 
they began, through Orenda Engine, to develop their 
own engine, thus adding to the unit cost of the aircraft. 
The contract for the fire-control system was to have 
been developed by Hughes Aircraft, but they declined the 
contract, which was passed on to R.C.A., at a y 
considerably increased cost due to the modifications 
(33) Debates, op. cit. pp. 994-995. 
(34) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on 
Defence Expenditures, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence (May 17, I960) (Ottawa; Queens Printer, 
lyou) p. 88. Hereafter referred to as the Halpenny 
Committee. 
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required in the aircraft.(35) The Velvet Glove air-
to-air missile, designed in Canada, was obsolete before 
its completion and hence the government elected to use 
the U.S. Navy Sparrow II. The U.S. Navy however, had 
decided to phase out this programme and suggested that 
if the Canadians still desired this system, they should 
complete its design and production themselves.(36) By 
early 1957, estimates of per unit cost had risen to 
$8 million and the Liberals were of course cautious 
not to raise the issue before June.(37) 
After the election and the Conservative victory, 
the development of the Arrow suffered further setbacks. 
Among the most destructive of these was the recognition 
that of the nine regular and eleven auxilliary squadrons 
which were to have the aircraft, only the regular forces 
would receive sufficient pilot training to man such a 
sophisticated weapon system; consequently, the production 
run was reduced to 100 units at an approximate cost of 
$12.5 million each. To compound matters further, 
production delays underlined the shift in strategic 
requirements for manned interceptors in the light of 
(35) McLin, J.B. pja. cit. p. 64. 
(36) Deputy Minister of National Defence Miller stated 
that the Sparrow was dropped by the U.S. Navy 
because they wanted a lower altitude weapon. 
Halpenny Committee, May 17, I960, p. 87. 
(37) McLin, J.B. p_£. cit. p. 69. 
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Soviet missile developments.(38) The government was 
therefore confronted with two alternatives to increase 
production so as to reduce unit costs: first to append 
the Arrow to Canada's N.A.T.O.'s contribution in 
Europe, which was not practicable because of the absence 
of S.A.G.E.;(39) secondly, to sell the aircraft to the 
U.S. which was reluctant to acquire an unproven system 
and had conflicting interests with its own aircraft 
industry. 
Diefenbaker consistently refused to admit that 
the exorbitant costs of such equipment was too high 
and instead announced that while production of the 
Arrow would be curtailed, development would continue 
for six months, and in the interim, Canada would 
acquire Bomarc missiles. Such vacillation on defence 
policy created another dilemma. Diefenbaker sought to 
explain the cancellation of the Arrow in terms of 
strategic requirements, namely, that I.CB.M.s eliminated 
the need for manned interceptors. Meanwhile, he had 
accepted Bomarc missiles, whose strategic designation 
was clearly anti-bomber.(40) 
General Pearkes, under the aegis of Diefenbaker, 
maintained that the Arrow was being discontinued for 
strategic reasons; but argued too, that manned 
(38) Gen.Foulkes testimony, October 22, 1963, pp. 509-510 . 
(39) McLin, J.B. p_p_. _cit. p. 70 . 
(40) Ibid, pp. 74-75. 
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interceptors would still be needed.(41) In this 
contention, General Pearkes was supported by the 
Chiefs of StaffCommittee who insisted that if the 
Arrow were discontinued, it must be replaced, 
preferably by a cheaper U.S. aircraft.(42) He later 
admitted that the Arrow was scrapped largely for 
reasons of cost. 'Scrapped' is particularly 
appropriate because Diefenbaker insisted that the 
existing prototypes be destroyed and were subsequently 
sent to Waxman's junk yard in Hamilton.(43) 
(5) The Bomarc Missiles 
General Pearkes, again, had considerable 
influence in the Bomarc issue; he asked the U.S. 
authorities if Bomarcs could be placed in Canada to 
protect population centers.(44) It was feared that 
unless some form of air defence system was placed in 
Canada's northern regions (North Bay) that a 
hypothetical atomic war would have as its battleground 
(41) Ibid, pp. 80-84. 
(42) General Foulkes stated that: "it did not make 
military sense to purchase aircraft at a cost of 
$8 million each when we could maintain aircraft 
with similar performance from the end of an 
American production line at something about $2 
million." Foulkes testimony, October 22, 1963, 
p. 510. 
(43) Newman, P.C. op_. cit. p. 348. 
(44) McLin, J.B. op_. cit. p. 86. 
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major population centers in the south.(45) At a 
meeting in 1958 between U.S. and Canadian delegations 
headed by U.S. Secretary McElroy and General Pearkes, 
the Canadians were informed that unless the Bomarc 
was accepted, the U.S. would establish a site south of 
the Great Lakes, thus assuring the incineration of the 
Toronto region, in the event of nuclear war.(46) This 
veiled threat was mitigated somewhat because the 
U.S. service chiefs, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, and General Pearkes were convinced of the 
Bomarc's utility: all that remained was for Diefenbaker 
to acquiesce. 
Confusion arose because there were in fact two 
Bomarcs: the A model, which could carry either a 
nuclear or a conventional warhead; the B model was 
capable of greater range and would carry only a nuclear 
warhead. Both versions of the Bomarc were essentially 
unmanned aircraft using jet fuel. Diefenbaker, 
initially, did not appear to be cognizant of such 
distinctions,(47) but later stated, in 1959, that: 
"the full potential of these defensive weapons is 
(45) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on 
Defence, June 18, 1963, p. 17. Hereafter 
referred to as the Sauve* Committee. 
(46) McLin, J.B. ap_. cit. p. 87. 
(47) Newman, P.C. op,, cit. p. 349. 
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achieved only when they are armed with nuclear 
warheads."(48) 
Having committed Canada to the acquisition of 
Bomarcs, the government was rudely shocked when the 
U.S. House Military Appropriations Subcommittee wanted 
to eliminate the Bomarc programme. Although the U.S. 
administration decided to continue its development 
concurrently with the Nike-Hercules programme, 
Canada's air defence policy was again in jeopardy. 
Pearkes attempted to conceal the inter-service 
controversy in the U.S. by claiming that the criticism 
was directed at the Bomarc A. The fat was in the fire 
however, when the U.S., following a study conducted by 
the U.S.A.F., decided to cut back the production of 
Bomarcs.(49) The House Appropriations Committee then 
recommended that the Bomarc programme should be 
eliminated altogether. Appropriately, Representative 
Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania pointedly remarked, "I 
would rather be a congressman from Cuba this week than 
the Secretary of Defence in Canada. " (50) 
Certainly the most irritating aspect of the 
cancellation of the Bomarc was that Canada, having only 
(48) McLin, J.B. 0£. cit. pp. 87-88. 
(49) Ibid, p. 91. 
(50) Ibid, p. 95-
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recently signed the N.O.R.A.D. agreement which 
included provision for * consultation*, was not in 
fact consulted at all, but rather informed of the 
American's intentions. 
Although in June, I960, the Senate Military 
Appropriations Subcommittee recommended to the House 
of Representatives that the $294 million cut from the 
Bomarc project be returned,(51) Canadian Opposition 
members were extremely critical of the plan to deploy 
the Bomarcs in Canada, due to, firstly, their 
vulnerability, and secondly, that the government agreed 
to accept them without having resolved the issue of 
nuclear warheads. The Liberals, in particular Mr. 
Pearson, argued that the use of such warheads be 
renounced, as well as their delivery system; they 
re-iterated the need for a manned interceptor.(52) 
The significance of such debates however, is, as McLin 
points out: 
"the Bomarc dispute produced somewhat 
clearer lines of disagreement between 
the major parties, and thereby opened 
(51) The Bomarc *B' squadrons were ultimately 
constructed and remained operational at North 
Bay until 1970. The first of six U.S. squadrons 
was phased out in 1970 and the remainder in 
1972. Janes Weapons Systems 1972-1973 (London: 
Paulton House, 1973) p. 52. 
(52) McLin, J.B. op_. cit. pp. 97-99* 
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the way for a thorough debate on 
defence that was needed."(53) 
Secondly, since Diefenbaker had accepted the Bomarc 
but had refused nuclear warheads, "the Bomarcs remained 
headless and totally useless."(54) 
(6) Nuclear Weapons 
The case of the Bomarc was illustrative of the 
dilemma faced by the Diefenbaker government, for while 
Diefenbaker adamantly refused to accept nuclear 
capability, he persisted in acquiring weapons systems 
which were either explicitly designed for nuclear 
weapons or those which could utilize either nuclear or 
conventional armaments, which, in the latter instance, 
were of highly questionable value. Although the R.C.A.F. 
wanted nuclear armaments for the Arrow they were 
relatively content, even though both the Sparrow II and 
Falcon missiles were equipped conventionally.(55) 
Nonetheless, the Arrow could have been equipped with 
nuclear armaments. The Bomarc B, designed for anti-
bomber defences, could, if equipped with atomic 
warheads, 'cook* Soviet bombs, rendering them harmless, 
whereas conventionally armed missiles, though destroying 
(53) Ibid, p. 100. 
(54) Newman, P.C. o_p_. cit. p. 350. 
(55) McLin, J.B. p_p_. cit. p. 130. 
- 78 -
enemy aircraft, could result in the detonation of 
their payload upon ground impact. The Lacrosse and 
Honest John rockets (delivered to the brigade in 
Europe) could have been armed either by nuclear or 
conventional means, however, the Honest John was 
considered *most inefficient* if armed conventionally. 
The F104*s delivered to the air division in Europe 
were similar to the Bomarc and Honest John rockets, 
completely unarmed, although they were designed to 
carry nuclear weapons. The Voodoos acquired from the 
U.S.A.F. in return for Canadair CF104 contracts were 
conventionally armed although while in U.S.A.F. service 
they were nuclear equipped. The net result of such 
purchases, quite apart from the unceremonious junking 
of the Arrow prototypes meant, as Newman has observed, 
that: 
"Canada, under John Diefenbaker*s 
management had spent $685 millions 
for the most impressive collection of 
blank cartridges in the history of 
military science."(56) 
The issue was not that Diefenbaker held an unequivocable, 
clearly delineated non-nuclear policy; rather, it was 
that: 
"All this military hardware had been 
acquired and then became useless for 
one reason: John Diefenbaker could not 
(56) Newman, P.C ojo. cit. p. 354. 
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make up his mind to arm the 
weapons. He seemed to fear the 
political consequences of decision. 
His cabinet was hopelessly split on 
the issue."(57) 
Two events precipitated the disintegration of 
Diefenbaker*s defence policy; the Cuban crisis and the 
remarks of former N.A.T.O. Commander General Norstad. 
Following the realization that Soviet ships were 
transporting missiles to bases in Cuba, U.S. President 
Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine; N.O.R.A.D. went on 
alert at Defcon 3. (Defence Condition 3, a N.O.R.A.D. 
state of readiness with Defcon 5 being 'normal* and 
Defcon 1 being *nuclear attack*). Canada, through 
N.O.R.A.D. Deputy Commander R.CA.F. Air Marshal Slemon, 
was requested to respond accordingly. Such a state of 
readiness had received the support of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee and Minister of National Defence 
Harkness, but required Diefenbaker*s approval. 
Diefenbaker delayed his decision for one day, ostensibly 
to co-ordinate civil defence efforts, but was in fact 
simply avoiding the decision. When Howard Green of 
External Affairs, cautioned that Canada should not ' 
(57) Ibid, p. 341. 
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plunge into action, Diefenbaker took up the clarion 
call and persuaded the Cabinet to reject Harkness* 
demand for alert. Pressure from N.O.R.A.D. and the 
military however, could no longer be withstood and, 
forty-two hours after N.O.R.A.D. had requested a state 
of Defcon 3 for Canadian units, the request was 
finally heeded.(58) As Newman observed: 
"It took the Cuban crisis to show the 
Canadian people that John Diefenbaker*s 
state of indecision had passed the 
point of responsible statesmanship. 
The Cuban affair also destroyed any 
remaining illusions Canadians may have 
had that the Diefenbaker government 
had a national defence policy... 
Diefenbaker had led Canada into 
military undertakings which he had then 
prevented from being met."(59) 
Four months later in January, 1963, General 
Norstad held a press conference in Ottawa, where he 
announced, in response to a series of questions about 
Canada*s role in N.A.T.O., that if Canada did not 
accept tactical nuclear strike squadrons, her N.A.T.O. 
commitments would not be fulfilled.(60) Three weeks 
later Diefenbaker was still procrastinating about 
providing the CF104 Starfighter with nuclear weapons; 
instead he declared that; "More and more the nuclear 
(53) Ibid, pp. 337-339. 
(59) Ibid, p. 333. 
(60) Ibid, pp. 352-355* 
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deterrent is becoming of such a nature that more 
nuclear arms will add nothing material to our 
defence."(61) Curiously, Harkness attempted to 
interpret the Prime Minister*s remarks as being 
favourable to nuclear armament. It soon became 
evident, however, that such was not the case. Later 
that week, during a Cabinet meeting, Harkness, 
formerly a Lieutenant-Colonel, attacked Diefenbaker 
for failing to make a clear decision on defence policy. 
Since the Prime Minister would not, Harkness resigned, 
thus setting in motion the chain of events which was 
to bring down the Diefenbaker government.(62) 
(7) Summary 
Doern and Aucoin*s description of policy-
making in the Diefenbaker government as * fused, 
personalized and passive* is particularly pertinent to 
defence policy. Prime Minister Diefenbaker*s failure to 
utilize sources of policy input other than that tendered 
by a coterie of political allies, his persistently 
incremental approach to policy, his deliberate confusing 
of defence issues and his excessive reliance upon 
General Pearkes and the Chiefs of Staff Committee resulted 
in a defence policy devoid of any coherent, long-range 
(61) Ibid, p. 361 . 
(62) Ibid, pp. 363-365. 
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programme. The absense of civilian control and 
direction over defence policy, since it had already 
been surrendered to General Pearkes and the Chiefs of 
Staff, coupled with the revelations of the Glassco 
Commission, led inevitably to unification. 
The third chapter, on Mr. Pearson's 
government, discusses innovations in the policy-making 
process, and the restructuring of influence which 
occurred as a result of unification leading to the 
assertion of civilian control and direction over the 
military. This chapter shall also describe the principal 
opposition to Mr. Hellyer*s programme to eliminate the 
three service elements. 
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Chapter III: The Pearson Period: 
Programme Management 
The Pearson administration was the 
transitional period between the fused and passive 
policy structures of the Diefenbaker government and 
the output-oriented, activist organizations of the 
Trudeau regime; that is, there were several innovations 
in policy structures which functionally performed 
similar roles as they had during Diefenbaker*s tenure, 
but came to fruition under Trudeau. Most notable 
among these changes were the relative independence of 
the Treasury Board vis a vis the Department of Finance, 
which later resulted in the Treasury Board being 
responsible for the Planning Programming and Budgeting 
System (P.P.B.S.) and the expansion and differentiation 
of the P.M.O. and the P.CO. Thus, the Pearson 
administration was the progenitor of what George 
Szablowski has called the * optimal* policy-making 
system.(1) 
(1) New Sources of Policy Inputs 
In Doern and Aucoin*s assessment of policy-making 
under Pearson's leadership, it is suggested that such 
(1) Szablowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making System: 
Implications for the Canadian Political Pre cess", in 
T.A. Hockin (ed.) Apex of Power (Toronto: Prentice-
Hall, 1971). p. 135. 
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innovations occurred largely because of the Prime 
Minister's expertise in compromise and negotiations, 
that such new policy-making machinery was ; 
"instinctively encouraged as being sensible and 
useful additions."(2). No doubt, however, that the 
willingness to experiment was complemented by the 
optimistic expectations for the economy and the 
contention of Walter Gordon that new programmes could 
be initiated and financially absorbed without 
substantial tax increases.(3) While new sources of 
policy input were encouraged, they arose on an ad hoc 
basis rather than being both programme oriented and 
cross-departmental,(4) as would be suggested by 
optiraal-P.P.B.S. management. 
There were however, two significant factors 
which contributed heavily to the development of 
policy-making organizations; the first of these being 
the recommendations of the Glassco Commission, and 
secondly, Pearson's attitude twoards the civil service. 
In respect to the civil service, it has been alleged 
by Schindler, that the civil service attained its 
pinnacle of power during the government of St. Laurent 
(2) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organization 
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin, 
op. cit. p. 53. 
(3) Ibid, p. 53. 
(4) Ibid, p. 57. 
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and Pearson.(5) 
"Policy was initiated in a given 
department...and only when the senior 
civil servants had a firm proposal to 
make did it come to the attention of 
the appropriate Minister who then 
presented it to the full Cabinet. 
Having had little or no opportunity 
to evaluate the merits of the 
proposal before it was presented to 
Cabinet, the other members of the 
Cabinet usually confirmed the 
recommendation."(6) 
Although Pearson did not distrust the civil service as 
does his successor,(7) nonetheless, as Maurice Lamontagne 
has pointed out, the Liberals under Mr. Pearson, having 
used non-governmental advisors in the formulation of 
policy while as members of the Opposition, were likely to 
employ the same methods when forming the government.(8) 
"Thus a new period is emerging in our 
country. I would describe it as the 
twilight of civil servants...I mean... 
that the Establishment will play a more 
limited role than in the past twenty-
five years and that it will have to 
share its privileged position near 
Ministers with new sources of political 
influence."(9) 
Schindler , F. "The Prime Minister and.the^Cabinet: History and Development", in T.A. Hockm, OJD. c i t . 
p. 27. 
Ibid, p. 27. 
Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of 
Policy Making in Canada" in the Canadian Journal of 
Political Science (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1971). Vol. IV, No. 2, 1971. p. 246. 
Lamontagne, M. "The Influence of the Politician", 
in Canadian Public Administration (Toronto: 
Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1968) 
Vol. II, No. 3, 1968. p. 266. 
Ibid, p. 266. 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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Certainly, analysis of the Pearson government 
would be incomplete without due consideration being 
given to the Glassco Commission, with particular 
attention focused upon the Treasury Board, and, as 
shall be described later, the Department of National 
Defence. The Glassco Commission: 
"recommended that departments and 
agencies be given the necessary 
authority and be held responsible for 
the management of money and staff... 
In the process, the Civil Service 
Commission and the Comptroller of the 
Treasury would be divested of various 
controlling powers they now possess, 
and much of the scrutiny by the 
Treasury Board of the details of 
departmental administration would be 
discontinued."(10) 
Further: 
"The new Board should...concentrate on 
the essential functions of 
administrative co-ordination and 
leadership: balancing programmes and 
defining priorities..."(11) 
One of the most important results of the Glassco 
Commission was, as Doern points out that: 
"The influx of accounting and 
financial personnel brought in to 
implement the Glassco recommendations 
on departmental accounts and control 
practices soon produced a cadre of 
experts who became concerned about 
(10) Glassco Commission, op_. cit. Vol. 5, No. 24, 
p. 81. 
(11) Ibid, p. 81. 
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the wider, central processes of 
source allocations."(12) 
In 1966 S.I.M.P.A.C, (Systems of Integral 
Management Planning and Control) was beginning to 
collect information from both the private and public 
sector to assist not only the calculations of programme 
costs but also to estimate their potential output.(13)• 
Pursuant to the Glassco Commission's recommendations, 
the Treasury Board acquired its own President and thus 
became, particularly with the advent of P.P.B.S., 
increasingly independent relative to the Department of 
Finance. Nonetheless, the Treasury Board continued to 
think of P.P.B.S.: 
"in relation to government expenditures 
and programmes rather than in terms of 
the impact of that philosophy on the 
relationship among the main central 
policy organizations."(14) 
Whereas under Diefenbaker the policy roles of 
the P.M.O. and P.CO. were fused, the addition of Tom 
Kent as Pearson's policy advisor meant that there was 
both a definite and 'visible* political presence 
(12) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of 
Policy Making in Canada", in the Canadian Journal 
of Political Science, op. cit. p. 255. 
(13) Ibid, p. 255, 
(14) Doern, G.B., "The Development of Policy 
Organization in the Executive Arena", in G.B. 
Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 52. 
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representing the Liberal party. Through Kent's effort, 
the political role of the P.M.O. became more clearly 
differentiated from the P.CO. The P.CO., rather than 
being an anomalous entity confronting diverse policy 
matters, was subdivided under four assistant secretaries 
having their own particular areas of concern. While 
such division of responsibility was not sufficient to 
allow for policy activists, nonetheless the structural 
differentiation of the P.CO. under Pearson did provide 
the basis for further sources of policy input under 
Trudeau.(15) 
Although Pearson, like Diefenbaker, relied 
heavily upon Royal Commissions (an average of four per 
year), such commissions were of generally an incremental 
orientation, although some, like the Hall Commission on 
Medicare, did to some extent suggest innovate policy.(16) 
The Pearson government however, did introduce the "task 
force" concept which had been utilized by U.S. President 
Kennedy. Such task forces were relatively inexpensive, 
quick, and relied largely upon extra-governmental sources 
in order to circumvent the sluggishness of the civil 
(15) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organization 
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin, 
op. cit. pp. 4*3-49. 
(16) Wilson, S.V. "The Role of Royal Commissions and Task 
Forces", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 116. 
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service. As Wilson has observed however: 
"It is difficult to determine the policy 
effectiveness of the extra-governmental 
task forces, because as Lloyd Oxworth 
has noted, 'under Lester Pearson, the 
Canadian Cabinet behaVed in the fashion 
of a modified confederation of Chinese 
war lords...* Nonethless it remains 
true that no hard thinking was devoted to 
the manner in which task forces fitted 
into a federal policy-making system..."(17) 
In 1963, the Economic Council of Canada was 
established. It was felt, and Pearson concurred, that 
having such a Council outside of government bureaucracy, 
would contribute to a * consensus* of economic planning 
within both the public and private sectors, without 
being constrained by government-inspired policy 
decisions. Thus, the Economic Council, through research 
and conferences on economic matters, played an advisory 
role to government as well as to the private sector; 
it has therefore been an important input into the 
formulation of economic policy. It should be pointed 
out that the Conservatives had also initiated the 
Productivity Council which reported to the Departments 
of Labour and Industry. It was not however, endowed 
with the independence and scope of the Economic Council, 
in fact, the Economic Council was permitted to publish 
its findings without necessarily having government 
(17) Ibid, p. 123. 
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approval.(18) 
With regards to the functional advisory 
Councils, both the Glassco and Hall Commissions 
determined that they had become * self-regulatory* 
rather than being regulated by the government. As 
a consequence, during the Pearson government, this 
criticism led to the founding of the Science 
Secretariat under the P.CO. and the Science 
Council.(19) While there was no doubt difficulty 
created in the relationship between the Science 
Secretariat and the Science Council due to, in some cases, 
joint membership, both organizations did contribute to 
attempts to define a national science policy as well as 
to oversee the Medical Research and the National 
Research Councils.(20) 
Contrasting with the Diefenbaker period, during 
which White Papers were used to publicize government 
policy, White Papers under Pearson became an instrument 
(18) Phidd, R.W. "The Role of Central Advisory Councils: 
The Economic Council of Canada", in G.B. Doern and 
P. Aucoin, op. cit. pp. 204-216. 
(19) Aucoin, P. '•The Role of Functional Advisory 
Councils", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin, o_p_. cit. p. 165. 
(20) Doern G.B., "The Role of Central Advisory Councils: 
The Science Council of Canada", in G.B. Doern and 
P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 248. 
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of testing opinion of 'intended' government policy. 
The White Paper on Defence(21) was utilized for this 
purpose particularly because the government, having a 
minority in Parliament, needed some Opposition support 
for such controversial policy(22); needless to say, 
such tendering for public opinion, in this case, met 
with unqualified, though not necessarily welcome, 
success. 
It can be seen therefore, that the Pearson 
government, though not as entirely 'rationalistic' as 
that of its successor Mr. Trudeau, did encourage new 
sources of policy input which were not bound to the 
turgid incrementalism of the past. The redefinition of 
roles for advisory organizations, the restructuring and 
differentiation of policy-making roles at the executive 
level, and the broader perspective of departmental 
accounting by way of the Treasury Board and S.I.M.P.A.C, 
though they did not reach operational maturity under 
Pearson, were unquestionably significant in the 
evolution of the policy process. 
(21) Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper 
on Defence. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, I964T This 
publication outlines Hellyer*s programme for 
unification as well as re-examining Canadian 
defence priorities. 
(22) Doern, A.D. "The Role of White Papers'*, in 
G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 184. 
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(2) The Reorientation of Defence Policy 
The efforts of the Pearson government to 
implement the new management procedures recommended by 
the Glassco Commission, the development of new sources 
of policy initiative, and the fledgling attempts to 
disassociate programme outputs from the incrementalism 
of the past was also represented in matters of defence 
policy. Such efforts acquired two forms; the redefinition 
of defence priorities and capabilities with respect to 
collective agreements, and the reorganization of the 
defence forces. Certainly these two tasks were not 
unrelated, since management, and civilian control 
and direction of the forces were co-terminous with the 
redefinition of priorities and their eventual 
subjection to P.P.B.S. 
The first step taken by the Liberals was to set 
up the Special Committee on Defence, the Sauve Committee,(23) 
to examine not only defence costs but also policy. The 
Sauve Committee called in non-government personnel to 
testify and to make recommendations at its'hearings; in 
addition, supplementary studies were in due course 
commissioned to deal with defence policy, security / 
agreements, arms control and disarmament. As well, 
(23) Sauve was the first chairman of the House of 
Commons Special Committee on Defence. 
- 93 - • 
a review of all defence commitments was begun. In 
the interim, the government suspended further equipment 
purchases. This was done, according to Paul Hellyer, 
because previously: "policy has been set to agree with 
the equipment already decided on."(24) Pursuant to 
this policy review, the government, with Mr. Hellyer as 
Minister of National Defence, published the White Paper 
on Defence of 1964. 
This White Paper indicated significant changes 
in government policy pertaining to defence commitments; 
namely, that Canada should determine roles and 
equipment requirements of her own forces rather than 
such roles and requirements being appended to the 
prescriptions of alliance commitments. These changes 
took the form of a restructuring of defence priorities 
in which U.N. operations took precedence over alliances. 
As McLin has noted: 
"In the past, the precedence of the 
former (alliances) had meant that 
peacekeeping operations had to be 
undertaken by forces the shape of 
which was determined primarily by 
alliance commitments. Now, however, 
those commitments were to be made 
only after the development of a 
coherent policy in which such 
(24) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on 
Defence, 1964. Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence. May 19, 1964, p. 11 Hereafter 
referred to as the Hahn Committee 
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factors as the requirements for 
peacekeeping forces would be taken 
into account."(25) 
Correspondingly, it was felt also, that this 
redefinition of priorities would adumbrate the excessive 
costs of trying to equip the forces with highly 
sophisticated equipment designed specifically for 
alliance commitments; namely the CF104*s strike-
reconnaisance role in N.A.T.O. Instead, the government 
desired that Canadian forces be organized and equipped 
for a multiplicity of operational roles as relatively 
autonomous, self-contained units. By way of example, 
the brigades in Europe were to be equipped with their 
own air support and air transport. As a corollary 
benefit, this policy meant that Canadian forces could 
be equipped through domestic defence industries such as 
Canadair. Canadian forces then, were to be self-contained, 
flexible and highly mobile contingents more amenable to 
U.N. requirements than to strategic requirements of the 
alliance.(26) 
It should be indicated however, that despite the 
emphasis given to peacekeeping, the equipment that 
Canada already possessed, Bomarcs, Honest John rockets 
(25) McLin, J.B. pjg. cit. p. 208. 
(26) Ibid, pp. 195-200, 
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and Voodoos, were in fact, supplemented with a variety 
of heavy equipment designed for diverse service roles. 
The White Paper also confirmed the present roles of 
the brigade and air division units in Europe; hence, 
alliance commitments were obviously not being 
abandoned.(27) Nonetheless, the Pearson government 
approached the issue of alliance commitments, 
particularly nuclear commitments, cautiously. 
Although both the Honest Johns and the Bomarcs 
were armed, the Liberals were reluctant to engage in 
subsequent debates over continued deployment of nuclear 
weapons systems. This became particularly evident in 
view of Canada*s * virtual abstention* from debates 
concerning the U.S. proposed *multi-lateral-force (M.L.F.) 
for N.A.T.O.(28) As McLin explains: 
"One of the reasons for this relative 
silence on questions of central 
importance for the future character of 
Canada*s alliance stands out above all 
others: the desire, indeed the political 
necessity, to avoid reviving the recently 
ended trauma about the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons."(29) 
The Pearson government, having rejected additional nuclear 
roles, then set about designing defence policy around 
the utilization of conventional forces for multinational 
and domestic requirements. 
(27) White Paper on Defence, 1964 op. cit. p. 21. 
(28) McLin, J.B. oj>. cit. p. 209. 
(29) Ibid, p. 211. 
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(3) Force Reorganization and Unification 
/ The effect of the Glassco Commission as 
described earlier, was to highlight the enormous 
difficulties which confronted the Canadian armed 
services: the disparity between manpower and equipment 
costs; duplication of services; the unwieldy committee 
structure; the absence of executive authority in the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee; and the realization that due 
to inadequate staffing in the Deputy Minister*s office 
and the multiplicity of channels directed to the 
Minister, civilian control was in jeopardy. The 
Pearson governments remedy for these issues was 
unification of the services.) 
Although the Glassco Commission had rejected 
unification, instead recommending that the Chairman of 
the C S . C be granted some executive authority, the 
White Paper insisted that such a plan was inadequate: 
"In the opinion of the Government, this 
solution does not adequately resolve 
the basic issues. If a single command 
structure is not established, 
co-ordination by the committee systems 
will remain with all of its inevitable 
delays and frustrations. The 
fundamental considerations are 
operation control and effectiveness, 
the streamlining of procedures, and, in 
particular, the decision-making process, 
and the redirection of overhead. To 
the extent that operational command is 
exercized by Canada, it is the view of 
the government that it can be most 
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effectively exercized by a single 
command."(30) 
This meant of course, that the armed forces would be 
integrated at the headquarters level, having a single 
Chief of Defence Staff. This then, would be the first 
step towards ultimate unification. 
Having accomplished this however, the central 
question remains, why was unification necessary if 
integration would accomplish many of the objectives of 
military organization. 
The answer to this is inexorably tied in to 
defence policy being envisaged as a programme output 
rather than being an incremental extention of previous 
policy. The Diefenbaker government would not extricate 
itself from the demands of alliance commitments and 
equipment purchases. Concomitantly, the government had 
denied itself the infusion of policy initiatives, 
prefering alternatively to rely upon the personal 
persuasions of General Foulkes, the Chairman of Chiefs 
of Staff, who assisted the *stampeding* of the 
government into N.O.R.A.D., and General Pearkes, the 
Minister of National Defence, who, as a serving officer 
and later as member of the government, demonstrated little 
hesitation in infringing upon civilian control or 
(30) White Paper on Defence 1964, op. cit. pp. 18-19. 
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granting ascendency to the military viewpoint. These 
• factors, coupled with a relating benign and understaffed 
Deputy Minister*s office, and the self-ordained 
jurisdictions of the separate services, meant that 
defence planning as a part of national and central 
policy objectives was virtually non-existent. This is 
precisely what Hellyer hoped to achieve through 
. unification, which could not be accomplished merely 
through the integration of the Chiefs of Staff Committee; 
\ there had to be expanded provision for civilian direction, 
that is, a 'restructuring of influence* in the 
f determination of defence policy. This was to be 
i effected through functional command, that is, programme-
' tasking of the service elements. 
Mr. Hellyer was adamant in his delineation of 
governmental and military responsibilities': 
"Ministers of National Defence are by 
law, responsible for the armed forces. 
I believe I have to listen to all of 
the advice that is available...But, 
having listened to it and evaluated it 
and analysed it, it is then the 
responsibility of the Minister to make 
a decision and recommend that decision 
to the government."(31) 
Mr. Hellyer, as Byers has stated: 
"was convinced...that over the years the 
military had increased its role to the 
point where civilian control was being 
endangered by the inability of civilians 
(31) Byers, R.B. op. cit. p. 2. 
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and politicians to adequately assess 
the proposals presented to them."(32) 
In May of I964, Hellyer asserted that the 
reorganization of the forces would: 
"permit an effective exercise of 
civilian control and equally important, 
civilian direction in the carrying out of 
defence policy as laid down by the 
government."(33) 
Hellyer then proceeded to undertake a number of measures 
to ensure the civilian control and direction of the 
forces. He created the office of Chief of Defence 
Staff to replace the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee so as to expediate decision-making and to 
reduce separate service demands upon the Minister. 
As Mr. Hellyer testified before the Hahn Committee:(34) 
"The main difference will be in practice... 
that submissions from the military force, 
from the chief of defence staff to the 
Minister and associate Ministers, will 
be considered and analysed by the Deputy 
Minister*s staff before they are 
considered in the defence council and 
before decisions are taken in respect of 
them...so that the Minister will have the 
advantage of a civilian point of view... 
there have been many cases throughout the 
years when proposals, particularly those 
having operational aspects, have not been 
^ given any analysis other than the analysis 
(32) Ibid, p. 4. 
(33) Ibid- P- 5, 
(34) Hahn succeeded Sauve as Chairman of the Special 
Committee on Defence. This Committee was a 
forum for the debates on Bill 90, the integration 
stage of unification. 
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they received in the forces before 
being proposed to the Minister."(35) 
Having eliminated the three service chiefs, Mr. Hellyer 
stated that: 
"problems of civilian control would 
be very much simplified. It will no 
longer be necessary to deal with three 
Defence staffs, which necessarily 
resulted in a good deal of the resources 
and energies of the civil staff being 
applied to problems of co-ordination."(36) 
The White Paper on Defence alluded to the: 
"introduction into the Department of 
National Defence a management system 
planning and controlling major Defence 
programmes at the Department level."(37) 
The reference was to control costs on a programme basis, 
but, Paul Hellyer also took further steps to insure 
civilian control by utilizing the Defence Council as a 
'cabinet* to the Department of National Defence. Mr. 
Hellyer outlined before the Hahn Commission the develop-
ment of the relationship between the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee and Defence Council, claiming that 'through 
custom, a division has occurred*,(38) between these two 
organizations because of the intensity of involvement 
(35) Hahn Committee, op_. cit. May 28, 1964, p. 38. 
(36) Byers, R.B. o£. cit. p. 6. 
(37) White Paper on Defence, 1964. op. cit. p. 20. 
(38) Hahn Committee, May 19, 1964, oj>. cit. p. 18, 
Testimony of Paul Hellyer. 
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the Chiefs of Staff Committee were engaged in post-war 
negotiations. As a consequence: 
"the Chiefs of Staff Committee advises 
the Minister'of National Defence 
and the Cabinet External Affairs and 
Defence Committee on matters of 
defence policy and prepares strategic 
appreciations and military plans as 
required. In addition, the Committee 
has been responsible for co-ordinating 
the efforts of the armed services in 
fulfillment of a single defence policy 
and over-all policy direction of joint 
service organizations."(39) 
The Defence Council, conversely, had been largely 
relegated to logistics and personnel duties.(40) 
Through the elimination of responsibilities for tri-
service co-ordination, and the infusion of additional 
civilian personnel from both within and outside of the 
department, Mr. Hellyer sought to have the Defence 
Council become "the principal departmental policy 
group."(41) 
The Deputy Minister's office, which had been 
singled out for criticism by the Glassco Commission for 
being unable to cope with the demands being, made upon 
it, was to be expanded in order that, as Mr. Hellyer 
stated, there would be;"a strong civil staff in the , 
defence department outside of the military chain of 
(39) Ibid, p. 19, 
(40) Ibid, p. 19. 
(41) Ibid, p. 19, 
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command"(42), to analyse military requirements and 
available resources; the 'defence programming* to which Mr. 
Hellyer had eluded .This then would also reduce the 
department's dependence on the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee for the determination of its finances. As 
Byers has observed, Hellyer's statement regarding the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee and the role played by the 
Deputy Minister and the Defence Council are clearly 
indicative that Mr. Hellyer was not at all content 
with the degree of civilian control as it existed prior 
to unification. 
Critical to the reorganization process was the 
evolution of functional command; essentially this 
meant the elimination of the eleven command structures 
which existed under the separate services and the 
redistrubtion of six commands organized on a functional 
basis. The new command structure was as follows: Air 
Transport Command replaced a very similar organization 
of the same name which had previously been under the 
authority of the R.CA.F.; Maritime Command (M.A.R.CO.M.) 
replaced both east and west coast maritime commands but 
with the Pacific command being directed from Halifax 
and including, greater integration of sea and air 
(42) Byers, R.B. o£. cit. p. 6. 
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components; Air Defence Command (AIRDEFCOM) which 
had been located in St. Hubert, Quebec, was relocated 
in North Bay, Ontario, with the AIRDEFCOM commander 
also being appointed senior Canadian member of N.O.R.A.D., 
Northern Region; Mobile Command (MOBCOM) was to be the 
largest command having within it most of the tactical 
air and operational land elements (3 brigades); 
Training Command (TRAINCOM) replaced Air Training 
Command and was to integrate trades common to all 
services as well as to innovate new planning techniques 
for their utilization; Material Command (MATCOM) was 
implemented to integrate the logistics of the three 
services into one system. In addition to the six new 
commands, the European brigade and air division 
were to report directly to headquarters, rather 
than to one of the commands.(43) 
The new command structure therefore, not only 
established a 'task orientation' for Canadian forces 
but was also conducive to the breaking up of the 
fiefdoms which the separate services had acquired for 
themselves. Not surprisingly, inter-services rivalry 
intensified as the services engaged in jerrymandering 
to influence the distribution of the functional commands. 
(43) Kronenberg, V.J., op_. cit. pp. 75-76. 
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(4) The Unification Debates 
The debates on unification, which ensued from 
1964 to 1967, became more furious as unification 
loomed closer; in fact, several senior naval officers 
were stunned when they came to realize that Mr. Hellyer 
actually intended to pursue such a scheme.(44) 
Although the debates on unification focused upon a 
variety of issues from operational roles and command 
structure to pay scales and retirement benefits, this 
section is concerned with the principal opponents of 
unification and the issues they raised. 
While much of the criticism from the services, 
particularly the Navy, was scarcely more than a 
lament for the loss of service traditions, nonetheless, 
Mr. Hellyer came under fire for the government's 
apparent inability or unwillingness to divulge its 
sources of military advice to support unification. Mr. 
Hellyer himself did very little to dispel such criticism.(45) 
(44) Admiral Landymore, who has weathered several 
attempts at integration and unification was 
apparently the first to realize that Mr. Hellyer 
was serious. Hellyer interview, August 1975." 
(45) Hahn Committee. May 19, 1964 op. cit. pp. 30-31 
Mr. Hellyer was questioned by Lambert as to the 
organizational basis of unification, that is, who 
had Hellyer consulted in devising this programme. 
Mr. Hellyer refused to address himself to the 
question. Lambert retorted that: "He is asking us 
and Parliament to approve of it on his word and 
that of the government." 
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Mr. Terrence Nugent accused the Minister of National 
Defence of ramrodding unification for no other purpose 
than to "ensure his own greatness".(46) He further 
argued that Mr. Hellyer's refusal to provide further 
information about unification amounted to nothing more 
than;"a barrage of propaganda and the bland assurance 
of the Minister that all is well."(47) 
Significantly, the roles which the Canadian 
forces would be capable of carrying out came under 
close scrutiny. W.B. Nesbitt stated that the Canadian 
hybrid would be unable to co-ordinate its operations 
with N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D.; further, that the forces 
were designed for a peacekeeping role exclusively which 
would result in Canada surrendering other defence 
responsibilities to the United States.(48) The Associate 
Minister of National Defence, Leo Cadieux, argued to 
the contrary that precisely because of unification, 
Canada would be better able to accomplish its designated 
defence roles. He insisted that the $1.5 billion in 
new equipment which included heavy artillery, anti-tank 
missiles, mortars and anti-submarine systems were 
obviously not for the purpose of peacekeeping missions 
alone.(49) 
(46) Debates, op. cit. January 31, 1967 p. 12477* 
(47) Ibid, p. 12478. 
^ ) Ibid. pp. 12470-12474. 
(49) Ibid, pp. 12535-12539. 
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The unification issue came to a head in 
August 1966 when Paul Hellyer dismissed Admiral 
Landymore for "eighteen months consistent disloyalty". 
Hellyer was vehement in his condemnation of Landymore's 
effort to organize support against unification: 
"A small group of officers is trying to 
run the Armed Forces...the civilian 
control of the military is the main 
issue...I have no intention of letting 
anyone - even if he's an Admiral - tell 
the government how to run the Armed 
Forces."(50) 
Mr. Hellyer later offered as a justification for firing 
Admiral Landymore: 
"to openly attempt to dictate a policy 
contrary to that approved by Parliament 
is simply not acceptable in a mature 
democracy. The principle of civilian 
control must be maintained."(51) 
Following his dismissal, Admiral Landymore claimed that 
it was "political science not military science,"(52) 
behind unification. He asserted that the proponents of 
unification could only justify their case through the 
explication of the merits of integration, not through 
unification.(53) He criticized the command structure of 
(50) Byers, R.D. op_. cit. p. 9, 
(51) Ibid, p. 9* 
(52) Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on 
National Defence Proceedings (Ottawa: Queens 
Printer 1967). 1967. Hereafter referred to as the 
Groos Committee. February 15, 1967, p. 1049, 
(53) Ibid, p. 1050. 
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Mobile Command, as dangerous to democracy because of 
the power invested in its commander.(54) 
Although several other Canadian officers had 
already expressed their disapproval of unification, 
including among them General Foulkes, Rear Admiral 
Brock, Major General Macklin and Air Marshal Curtis, 
organized opposition surfaced in 1967 when the 
Tri-Service Identities Organization (TRIO)(55) and the 
Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian 
Defence Forces(56) presented their briefs to the Groos 
Committee. These organizations were strongly opposed 
to unification arguing that; (a)since unification did 
not have the support of many serving officers its 
credibility was in doubt, (b)that the Defence Council 
did not have sufficient service representation, (c)that 
the officers who were retired prematurely were instructed 
to as a result of their opposition to unification, 
(d)that the degree of civilian^_control was excessive. 
Opposition to unification then, still centred 
upon the relative advantages of integration vis a vis 
unification. In response to his critics Mr. Hellyer 
had consistently argued that: 
(54) Ibid. p. 1086. 
(55) Ibid. February 10, I967, pp. 734-741. 
(56) Ibid. February 13, 1967, pp. 889-919. 
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"no over-all strategic plan applied 
to the three services...there was no 
over-all co-ordination of the 
equipment programmes in the sense 
that priorities were established on 
a hard basis to fulfill national 
objectives..."(57) 
The tendency of the Chiefs of Staff to support each 
other's requests for equipment on a quid pro quo basis 
meant that such equipment purchases were not based upon 
national needs, but rather upon those of the individual 
services and their commanders.(58) 
Although the Navy had persistently sought to 
stress the distinctiveness of its service roles and 
traditions, Mr. Hellyer argued that such a xenophobic 
point of view tended to: "preserve the traditions of a 
particular service rather than contributing to the total 
defence picture".(59) To illustrate his point, Mr. 
Hellyer cited the inter-service rivalry over the 
Caribou aircraft between the Army and the R.CA.F., and 
the dispute over the N.A.T.O. 7.62 rifle which the Army 
had wanted but the R.CA.F. and R.C.N, had not. It 
took five years to finally procure the rifle.(60) 
In response to criticism that integration alone 
would resolve Canadian defense problems without the 
negative aspects of unification, Mr. Hellyer replied 
(57) Debates. op. cit. February 3, 1967, pp. 14431-14433. 
(58) Groos Committee, op. cit. February 23, 1967, p. 1562. 
(59) Ibid, p. 1562. 
(60) Ibid, p. 1562. 
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that: 
"It would be impossible to maintain 
integrated forces over a long 
period of time. Integration is not 
a stable position.n(6l) 
(6) Summary 
The transition from separate to a Unified service 
was at times a painful endeavour. The change to 
functional command proceeded relatively smoothly because 
in many instances, the new structure did not necessitate 
sweeping reform; many roles under both systems were 
similar. At headquarters it had been an altogether 
different situation since unification sought to impose 
nwhat was essentially a civilian mode of organization 
upon a military structure; this was even more complex 
during the initial stages because the two systems of 
organization were both operative at the same time. This, 
coupled with the government's failure to produce a 
detailed plan for reorganization, meant that^there were 
many changes in roles and responsibilities as the 
government attempted to 'muddle through*. 
Defence policy, then, under the Pearson 
government, had accomplished a number of significant 
tasks: the redefinition of defence policy priorities, 
(61) Ibid, p. 1582. 
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while not entirely in conformity with a 'national 
mission', had decreased dependence upon alliance 
systems in the determination of policy and equipment 
procurement; it had reorganized the armed forces into 
a unified body and eliminated many of the redundancies 
and archaic traditions endemic to separate services; 
the new command structure had been designed along 
functional lines rather than corresponding to traditional 
service tasks. Of singular importance is that through 
unification, the 'restructuring of influence' had 
unquestionably asserted the principle of civilian 
control and direction of the military. 
As described in chapter four, although Mr. 
Pearson's government had stimulated new sources of policy 
input and had provided the machinery for long-range 
defence planning, the transition in the policy-making 
process was not complete. It remained for Prime Minister 
Trudeau to be the innovator of the 'optimal policy-making 
system'. In terms of defence, this meant, (a)the 
reappraisal of the objectives of defence policy in 
congruence with national objectives, and (b)the 
determination of the management changes necessary to 
accomplish them. 
Significantly, this chapter also suggests, through 
an examination of the effects of optimal policy-making 
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upon the political executive and the defence 
establishment, that the transition in the policy-
making system is continuing. Unlike Doern and 
Aucoin, who have assumed,incorrectly, that the 
policy-making process occurs in a linear progression, 
this chapter suggests that the over-centralization 
of authority, and the failure to recognize the 
necessity of 'special skills', namely, those of the 
military, shall have serious implications for 
parliamentary government and for the military's 
ability to accomplish its assigned roles. 
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Chapter IV: The Trudeau Period: 
Systems Management 
Although the previous Liberal government was 
instrumental in developing nev sources of policy 
initiative, they evolved largely because of the 
•benevolent acquiescence*(1) of Pearson rather than 
being a clearly determined attempt to reform the 
policy-making structure. The Pearson government, 
despite such sources of policy initiative, remained 
attuned to the incrementalism of the past and made 
little effort to co-ordinate programmes on a cross-
departmental basis; this is not however, so much a 
criticism of Pearson as it is the recognition that 
programme management was then not a mature phenomenon. 
With the advent of Pierre E. Trudeau as Prime 
Minister, systems management had acquired an apostle, 
for Trudeau was a protagonist of the ingestion of 
•rationality* into government: 
"Nationalism will eventually have to be 
rejected as a principle of sound 
government. In the world of tomorrow, 
the expression 'banana republic' will 
not refer to independent fruit growing 
nations but to countries where formal 
independence has been given priority / 
over the cybernetic revolution. In 
(1) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of 
Policy Making in Canada", in Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, op. cit. p. 248. 
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short, if not a pure product of 
reason, the political tools of the 
future will be designed and 
appraised by more rational standards 
than anything we are currently using 
in Canada today."(2) 
Trudeau descended on Ottawa imbued with the spirit of 
innovation, and disdain for the languid, incrementalistic 
approach of his predecessors in the definition of policy 
priorities: 
"And some of these programmes - its 
really incredible when you begin to 
look at these in detail - some of 
the programmes were started back in 
the 1920*s - to meet a real need 
then. But they no longer have the 
same justification."(3) 
He condemned policies and institutions whose effects 
were debilitating on the government's ability to 
exercize 'rational' decisions. He referred to Parliament 
as *a Coney Island shooting gallery', perennially 
dedicated to patching up crises but not resolving them. 
Low priority programmes inherited from the past were to 
be scrapped in order to funnel resources into high 
priority policies. The political party, the Prime 
Minister explained: 
"which is attuned to the needs of our 
society is not one which confines , ' 
itself to particular employment or 
(2) Doern, G.B. "The Policy-Making Philosophy of 
Prime Minister Trudeau and his Advisors", in 
T.A. Hockin. op. cit. p. 128. 
(3) Ibid, p. 130. 
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income groups, or which speaks 
for particular regions or language 
i groups, but one which reaches out 
to absorb the ideas and to reflect 
the aspirations of all Canadians... 
It may be that, in future, political 
parties will be distinguished from 
one another, not so much by issues, 
as by the perspective in which they 
view such issues and the method 
which they employ in devising new 
policies to resolve them."(4) 
Trudeau then, clearly rejected the premises of 
incrementalism and i t s costly hand-outs to disparate 
groups and regions, he offered instead policy 
determined by national objectives through the 
co-ordination of programme outputs. He argued that a 
bill of rights, that is, a declaration of goals, be 
firmly ensconced in a constitution prior to the 
differentiation of federal and provincial powers. He 
distrusted the conservatism and influence of the civil 
service in the making of government policy and 
alternatively surrounded himself with computer and 
communications specialists.(5) Policy, then, would no 
longer be aimed at what Noel has described as "the 
(4) Hockin, T.A. "Pierre Trudeau on the Prime Minister 
and the Participant Party", in T.A. Hockin. op_. cit. 
pp. 97-100. 
(5) Doern, G.B. "The Policy Making Philosophy of Prime 
Minister Trudeau and his Advisors', in T.A. Hockin. 
op. cit. p. 133. 
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accomodation of elites",(6) in the absense of national 
symbols and goals, but rather upon the optimization of 
policy objectives as they relate to other policies and 
available resources.(7) 
Critical to such a policy orientation (and to 
any other) are the sources of Prime Ministerial advice; 
the distinctiveness of the Trudeau regime however, has 
been the rapid expansion of these sources. As Stewart 
points out, in 1967, under Pearson, the P.M.O. had 12 
members, the P.CO. 156; under Trudeau the P.M.O. had 
increased to 92 and the P.CO. to 292 by 1972.(8) 
Quite apart from quantitative changes, there have also 
been a number of substantive changes in the organization 
of the P.M.O. and P.CO. 
(6) Noel, S.J.R. "The Prime Ministers Role in a 
Consociational Democracy", in T.A. Hockin. op_. cit. 
p. 104. Noel argues that in a nation such as 
Canada, having no national symbols but numerous 
subcultures, a Prime Minister may continue to 
govern only through accomodation of elites at the 
provincial level. 
(7) Szablowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making 
System: Implications for the Canadian Political 
Process", in T.A. Hockin. op_. cit. p. 137. 
Szablowski states that: "optimizing is concerned 
with the relations among objectives. Thus, a 
decision-maker considers the adoption of a specific 
policy aiming at a specific goal must take into 
account all other policy goals relevant to the issue 
area and the resource requirements needed for their 
implementation." Such policy would have precedence 
over the regional accommodation of elites, p. 137. 
(8) Stewart, Walter. Trudeau in Power. (New York: 
Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1971). p. 179. 
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(1) Expansion of Government Institutions 
There have been three major developments in 
the P.CO., the first of these being the appointment 
of three deputy secretaries whose functions are 
planning, operations and federal-provincial relations. 
Their significance is that they are more concerned with 
policy development, rather than acting as secretaries 
to the Cabinet. Secondly, Michael Pitfield, a 
personal friend of the Prime Minister and an advocate 
of 'rational* policy-making, was chosen to head the 
P.CO. planning group.(9) The third development 
pertains to the Cabinet Committees whereby the Prime 
Minister is the Chairman of the Federal-Provincial 
Relations Committee and the Planning and Priorities 
Committee.(10) There are nine such standing committees, 
including the External Affairs and Defence Committee. 
As well, there are several functional committees of a 
temporary or ad hoc nature which have resulted in the 
appointment of additional assistant secretaries in the 
P.CO. As Doern points out: 
"The net result of the committee system 
is that most issues that go before the 
(9) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organizations 
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin 
op. cit. pp. 54-55. 
(10) Schindler, F. "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
History and Development", in T.A. Hockin. 0£. cit. 
p. 44. 
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full Cabinet will have been assessed 
in at least one of the Cabinet 
sub-committees. Also many matters 
are actually decided by the Committee 
in that formal Cabinet approval is 
assured unless there is a division in 
the Committee or unless a Minister 
has strong views and wishes to take 
it to the full Cabinet."(11) 
The sheer volume of committee work however, 
could be deleterious to a Minister*s other 
responsibilities, and so the P.M.O.s function is to; 
"Differentiate and improve the quality of...the 
political input into policy deliberations."(12) As a 
consequence, the role played by Tom Kent under Mr. 
Pearson has been expanded and formalized under Trudeau. 
In addition, the P.M.O. seeks to; * ensure that P.M.O. 
inputs are present at the very earliest stages of 
policy formulation* and therefore; "representatives of 
the P.M.O. sit on various inter-departmental 
committees...and on committees of the Privy Council 
Office."(13) There are, in addition, several other steps, 
including P.M.O.-P.CO. co-ordinating meetings, during 
which the Prime Minister attempts to ensure a political 
•presence* in policy development.(14) Trudeau has also 
(11) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organization 
in the Executive Arena," in T.A. Hockin. o£. cit. 
pp. 56-57. 
(12) Ibid, pp. 56-57. 
(13) Schindler, F. "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
History and Development", in T.A. Hockin. p. 45. 
(14) Ibid. p. 46. 
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utilized the creation of Ministers without 
Portfolio, to augment political inputs, as well as 
'regional desks', to keep in touch with party officials 
and 'backbenchers' . 
This liason between the P.M.O. and the P.CO. 
also had important implications for P.P.B.S. Whereas 
P.P.B.S., as contemplated by the Pearson government, 
was centred upon fiscal control and programme outputs 
on a departmental basis, under Trudeau, P.P.B.S. is 
intimately involved with the central organs of the 
policy process itself. P.P.B.S. then becomes an; 
"information system designed to produce and recombine 
information in such a way that it will serve planning 
programming and budgeting objectives in an integrative 
way."(15) To this end, resources are allocated on the 
basis of broad functional categories, including among 
them, health and welfare, government services, defence, 
and others; as a result, the department is no longer 
the basic unit of policy determination. The Cabinet 
Committee on Priorities and Planning, chaired by the 
Prime Minister^ "expresses its priorities for any 
given year according to these broad functional categories."(16) 
(15) Doern, G.B. "The Budgetary Process and the Role of 
the Federal Bureaucracy", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin. 
op. cit. p. 89. 
(16) Ibid, p. 91. 
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In addition, the Treasury Board, through P.P.B.S., is 
engaged in long-range planning for resource a l l o c a t i o n s . 
There have also been significant changes in 
other sources-of policy input'; Mr. Trudeau, unlike his 
predecessors, has tended to prefer 'task forces' over 
Royal Commissions. As Wilson points out, however: 
"The entire process of using outside 
consultants and task forces, and the 
creation of an inventory of professional 
personnel outside of government whose 
talents could be tapped on a temporary 
basis, do indicate a concerted effort 
to place the Prime Minister's Office in 
a strong controlling position over 
policy formation."(17) 
- Task forces have come under fire for a variety of reasons. 
By way of example, Mr. Hellyer*s housing task force/,,s 
drew criticism for its methodological weaknesses and 
insufficient expertise.(18) Furthermore, the task 
forces are not required to publish their results, and 
consequently, their research findings are available 
only to the Cabinet and perhaps to some senior civil servants, 
to the exclusion of Parliament.(19) 
The changing role of White Papers is clearly 
aligned with the Prime Minister*s predilections for 
(17) Wilson, U.S. "The Role of Royal Commissions and 
Task Forces", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin. op. cit. 
p. 123. 
(18) Ibid, p. 125. 
(19) Ibid, p. 124. 
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cybernetics, that is, the White Paper becomes a 
communication interaction mechanism*(20) between the 
government and the public. As Wilson points out; 
"(the) rationalistic approach to policy-
making emphasizes long-range planning 
and review. Thus, the White Paper is 
conceived of as a part of a larger 
exercise of review."(21) 
Although there have been a number of White Papers on 
diverse policy issues, Doerr asserts that their 
objective, to stimulate public debate, has not been 
entirely successful principally because there has not 
been a public forum for debate.(22) This problem has to 
some degree been resolved as witnessed by the more recent 
•green* papers and public discussions on immigration 
policy. 
The examples provided by the relationship 
between the Science Council, the National Research 
Council, and the Medical Research Council are instructive 
as to the dilemmas which the government encountered 
when it attempted to append a functional advisory 
council having its own area of responsibility into a 
P.P.B.S. system. 
(20) Doerr, A.D. "The Role of White Papers", in G.B. 
Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 186. 
(21) Ibid, p. 185. 
(22) Ibid, p. 198. 
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The Science Council, which was to be the policy 
overseer of the other councils, proved to be; "excessively 
preoccupied with developing its long-range rationalistic 
posture"(23) and not on policy development. The National 
Research Council and the Medical Research Council prefer 
to ignore the Science Council and cultivate instead 
whatever scientific activity they are presently engaged 
in. As Aucoin points out, their approach to policy has 
been entirely incremental and seemingly dedicated to; 
"frustrating the attempts of the Federal Government to 
establish science policies to accomplish national 
goals."(24) As Doern has suggested, the relationship 
between such organizations must be subject to revision: 
"not on the naive assumption that somehow 
the total policy-making process must 
have some central deposits of information, 
but rather the assumption that it is 
important that the relationship between 
such organizations be conceptualized in 
some way."(25) 
The Economic Council of Canada has also changed 
significantly in regard to its contribution to policy 
(23) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of 
Policy-Making in Canada",in Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, op. cit. p. 262. 
(24) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organizations 
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin. 
op. cit. p. 75. 
(25) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of 
Policy-Making in Canada", in Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, op. cit. p. 202. 
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development. Under Pearson, the Economic Council was 
preoccupied with what it has called * performance goals* 
including among its research areas regional development, 
tariffs, manpower and transportation policy.(26) In 
1969 however, following the poverty report, the Economic 
Council expressed their interest in * achievement 
goals*(27), that is, fundamental national objectives. 
This was in part a reaction to the limited role which 
P.P.B.S. had played under Mr. Pearson. Under Mr. 
Trudeau, however, there was congruence between the 
Prime Minister*s desire for * counterweights*(28) of 
policy input and the Economic Council's willingness to 
provide them. 
The Trudeau period has witnessed many significant 
changes in the policy-making process: the expansion, 
differentiation and formalization of policy roles in 
the P.M.O. and P.CO.; the expanded responsibilities of 
the Treasury Board in the implementation of P.P.B.S.; 
the emergence of functional committees in the Cabinet 
Secretariat; the pervasive influence of the Prime 
Minister in P.CO.-P.M.O. liason and the Priorities and 
(26) Phidd, R.W. "The Role of Central Advisory Councils: 
The Economic Council of Canada", in G.B. Doern and 
P. Aucoin. op_. cit. p. 236. 
(27) Ibid, p. 237. 
(28) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of 
Policy-Making in Canada", in Canadian Journal of 
Political Science. op. cit. p. 25. 
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Planning Committee; the activist role of the Economic 
Council of Canada in pursuant of 'achievement goals'; 
the public debate encouraged by the use of White 
Papers as interaction mechanisms. The emphasis placed 
upon planning and the defining of priorities is of 
course underscored by the Prime Minister's personal 
philosophy of policy development; policy as functional 
categories of cross-departmental programme outputs. It 
is to be anticipated that such tendencies would reveal 
themselves as well in defence policy. 
(2) Defence Policy and the Role of Unified Forces 
Unification had accomplished many of its 
objectives: (a) the Chiefs of Staff were integrated 
under a single Chief of Defence Staff; (b) the traditional 
lines of command were dispersed with the imposition of 
functional command; (c) separate services were 
eliminated, and (d) civilian direction and control had 
been firmly established. What remained to be determined 
however, was the objectives of defence policy, that is, 
what role was the military to play. 
\. Congruent with the Prime Minister's policy / 
objectives and methods, he announced a foreign policy 
statement in April, 1969, outlining the impending
 x 
redefinition of Canadian defence policy. Mr. Trudeau 
\ 
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argued that: 
"N.A.T.O. had in reality determined all 
of our defence policy. We had no defence 
policy, so to speak, except that of 
N.A.T.O. And our defence policy had 
determined all of our foreign policy... 
It is a false perspective to have a 
military alliance determine your foreign 
policy. It should be your foreign 
policy which determines your military 
policy."(29) 
Subsequently the new priorities for defence were to 
emphasize the protection of Canadian sovereignty rather 
than alliance commitments. 
The review of defence policy had been going on 
since 1969 and culminated in the publication of a 
White Paper in 1971, Defence in the 70% under the 
authority of the new Minister of National Defence, 
Donald MacDonald. The influence of the foreign policy 
review was clearly evident: 
"Defence policy cannot be developed in 
isolation. It must reflect and serve 
national interests, and must be closely 
related to foreign policy which the 
government reviewed concurrently with 
defence. In the course of these reviews 
the principle that defence policy must 
be in phase with the broader external 
projection of national interests was 
underlined."(30) 
(29) Canada, Department of External Affairs. Statements 
and Speeches. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1969). 
April 12, 1969. pp.2-4. 
(30) Canada, Department of National Defence. Defence 
in the 70's. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1971). p. 3. 
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Citing the "increase in stability in nuclear 
deterrence" and the "return to a form of multi-polarity in 
the international system"(31), the White Paper on Defence 
argues that: 
"A catastrophic war between the super powers 
constitutes the only major military threat 
to Canada...Canada's overriding defence 
objective must therefore be the prevention of 
nuclear war by promoting political reconciliation 
to ease the underlying causes of tension, by 
working for arms control and disarmament agreements 
and by contributing to the system of stable 
mutual deterrence."(32) 
While declaring allegiance to alliance commitments however, 
the White Paper directs attention to the maintenance of 
sovereignty through surveillance, norther development and 
aid to the civil power. The priorities for Canadian 
defence therefore become: 
"(a) the surveillance of our own territory and 
coast lines: i.e. the protection of our 
sovereignty; (b) the defence of North America 
in co-operation with U.S. forces; (c) the 
fulfillment of such N.A.T.O. commitments as 
may be agreed upon; (d) the performance of 
such international peacekeeping roles as we 
may from time to time assume."(33) 
The elucidation of such priorities stands in contrast to the 
collective security and peacekeeping roles that the Pearson 
government was so enamoured with. Protection of sovereignty 
would include surveillance of violations of Canadian airspace, 
which would be, in part, operative through N.O.R.A.D. 
installations, although a number of these were shut down. 
Also, surveillance would be undertaken to ensure control 
(3D Ibid, p. 4. 
(32) Ibid, p. 6. 
(33) Tbid. p. 16. 
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of northern regions and coastal waterways; the latter would 
embrace such items of assistance to the civil authorities 
as patrolling foreign fishing fleets, ice reconnaissance 
and mineral explorations.(34) The Canadian land forces 
would also come to the aid of the civil power should the 
need arise as in the case of the October crisis and the 
rioting at Kingston Penitentiary. 
The Canadian contribution to North American defence 
would also acquire new characteristics. While reaffirming 
that co-operation with the U.S.;"will remain essential so 
long as our joint security depends on stability in the 
strategic nuclear balance", the government decided to curtail 
the Bomarc anti-bomber defence and to reduce the significance 
of the anti-submarine warfare role in preference to other 
maritime duties. Furthermore, the Honest John system was 
abandoned and the CF104s would drop the nuclear strike role 
in Europe; therefore, only the CF101 Voodoos would require 
a nuclear capacity.(35) 
In April, 1969, the Prime Minister announced that 
as part of the defence policy review, N.A.T.O. contributions 
would be reduced.(36) As Szablowski points out, this 
too was another example of optimized planning. 
(34) Ibid, pp. 16-24. 
(35) TbTd. p. 30. 
(36) Canada, Department of External Affairs. "A Defence 
Policy for Canada" in External Affairs . (Ottawa: 
Queens Printer, 1969). Vol. XXI, No. 5, May, 1969. 
N.A.T.O. contributions were to be reduced because 
of the economic and military recovery of Europe. 
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The government reason was that: 
"continued deployment of resources to 
N.A.T.O. at the same level would have 
resulted in the progressive minimization 
of the aggregate output in the entire 
defence policy area because of the size 
of the N.A.T.O. resource allocation 
relative to the remaining defence policy 
goals."(37) 
Resources diverted from N.A.T.O. could be then applied 
to higher priority tasks, namely surveillance. 
The White Paper on Defence made evident Canada's 
disenchantment with, though continued willingness to 
participate in, peacekeeping operations. 
"The experience has all too often been 
frustrating and disillusioning. Some 
operations have been severely hampered 
by inadequate terms of reference and 
by a lack of co-ordination on the part 
of those involved. Other detrimental 
factors have been the absense of 
political support of some of the great 
powers, and insufficient international 
logistic and financial resources. 
Certain operations have tended to 
become 'open ended* in the absense of 
political settlement between the 
parties to a dispute."(3^) 
Such circumstances were re-confirmed during Canada's 
participation in the I.CCS. mission in Vietnam; (39) 
(37) Szablowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making System: 
Implications for the Canadian Political Process", in 
T.A. Hockin. ojo. cit. p. 137. 
(38) White Paper on Defence: Defence in the 70*s. op. cit. 
p. 40. 
(39) Viet-Nam: Canada*s Approach to Participation in the 
International Commission of Control and Supervision. 
Canada, Department of External Affairs, (Ottawa: 
Queens Printer, 1973) p. 16. 
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Canada subsequently withdrew from the mission; having become 
somewhat more particular about the criteria upon 
which to engage in peacekeeping.(40) 
Following the publication of Defence in the 
70*s. the Department of National Defence began 
publishing a yearly review of the activities of the 
department, cautioning however, that these publications 
were for the purpose of review only, not policy 
papers.(41) These reviews did not deviate substantially 
from the White Paper on Defence, in terms of the 
objectives of national defence; there was however, a 
number of managerial changes which carried serious 
implications. 
The first of these to be considered, given Mr. 
Trudeau*s 'optimal policy' stance and his insistence 
on cross-departmental functional outputs, were the 
defence priorities established in the White Paper which 
required the participation of several departments to 
accomplish these objectives. Since the military, prior 
to unification, was more accustomed to tending its own 
(40) Proceedings from the Atlantic Council of Canada. 
Toronto. May, 1975. The discussion focused on 
the pre-conditions for Canada's participations in 
peacekeeping operations. 
(41) Canada, Department of National Defence. Defence 1972 
(Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1973). In the preface to 
Defence 1972, Minister of National Defence 
Richardson was emphatic that these annual reviews did 
not indicate impending policy changes. 
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backyard, the co-ordination of departments became a 
difficult task. As J.F. Anderson, Director of 
Programme Analysis, and Dr. J.C Arnell, Assistant 
Deputy Minister (Finance) of the Department of 
National Defence, report, since: 
"the principal, if not the only, direct 
military threat to Canada's national 
security is that incidental to nuclear 
war...which Canada is unable to escape... 
or prevent such an attack...Canada is 
incapable of establishing its security 
requirements in terms of a direct defence 
of its national territory...The consequence 
is that there is really no way for the 
Canadian defence analyst to define 
objectively either an upper or lower limit 
of the amount of resources which Canada 
should expend on its own defence."(42) 
This was of course, further compounded by the 'non-
military* nature of some of the new defence priorities. 
Dr. Arnell(43) and Mr. Anderson argued that these 
priorities required greater ministerial direction and 
cross-departmental co-ordination to determine the degree 
(42) Anderson, J.F. and Arnell, J.C. "Programme 
Management in the Department of National Defence", 
in Canadian Defence Quarterly. Vol I, No. 2. p. 31. 
(43) Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on 
External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence, Hahn Committee. Nov. 21, 
1968. Dr. Arnell detailed the difficulties 
encountered in attempting to apply P.P.B.S. to 
services accustomed only to a "single operational 
environment", pp. 550-554. 
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of support which the military would provide, 
particularly with reference to surveillance. Such 
direction and co-ordination ultimately involved the 
Departments of Fisheries, Transport, Indian Affairs, 
Energy, National Revenue, and the R.CM.P. 
It is scarcely surprising that such complex 
relationships gave rise to the need for a Management 
Review Group, created in 1971 to;"improve the 
co-ordination between the military, civilian and 
research staffs of the Department."(44) The 
Management Review Group sought to dispose of what was 
essentially two staffs, one civilian, another military, 
working under the Minister of National Defence. This 
had created needless duplication of effort and serious 
problems of co-ordination. 
Under the new system, both the Deputy Minister 
and the Chief of Defence Staff are jointly responsible 
for military management, supplemented by the appointment 
of several assistant Deputy Ministers, functionally 
organized. Both the Chief of Defence Staff and the 
Deputy Minister however, do retain some explicit power 
of their office, in the former case the control and 
administration of the forces, and in the Deputy Minister*s 
(^) Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
- 131 -
case, the powers to act on behalf of the Minister.(45) 
The military chain of command outside of headquarters, 
is retained. Nevertheless, the implications of such 
changes are that there has been an injection of civilian 
staff and management techniques into headquarters. 
(3) The Effect of Optimal Policy-Making 
Policy-making in Canada has passed through three 
distinct stages; the *fused, personalized and passive* 
policy organizationsunder Mr. Diefenbaker; the 
beginning of new sources of policy initiative and the 
differentiation of policy roles, co-terminus with 
incrementalism, under Mr. Pearson; the expanded, 
formalized, differentiated, and active sources of policy 
inputs under Mr. Trudeau. Defence policy, similarly, 
has evolved in congruence with the policy-making 
structure: under Mr. Diefenbaker, the excessive 
influence of the military in the determination of policy 
and, the indecisiveness which led to adherence to 
previous policy and equipment commitments; under Mr. 
Pearson, the review and reorientation of such 
commitments, and the attempts, through unification, to 
exercise civilian control and ultimately civilian 
direction over the military; the Trudeau period, which 
has dramatically redefined defence priorities, 
(45) Ibid, pp. 13-15. 
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consolidated civilian control and imposed civilian 
direction even within the chain of command at 
headquarters. 
One could conclude from this that the 
Optimization of policy* and the 'civilianization' of 
the military, is the *best of all possible worlds*, 
wherein the current military malaise is but an 
aberration from the logical progression of systems. 
Such a conclusion becomes suspect however, given the 
fact that under the current Minister of National Defence, 
James Richardson, the de-unification process has begun. 
Furthermore, recent years have witnessed a deterioration 
in the enthusiasm for P.P.B.S. as the foundation of 
policy development, as well as resentment over the Prime 
Minister*s methods in introducing policy proposals. 
Such events have raised crucial questions not only 
concerning defence policy, but about the nature of 
policy-making, indeed, parliamentary government itself. 
(a) Prime Ministerial Government and P.P.B.S. 
With reference to the source of Prime Ministerial 
authority, Szablowski points out that: 
"The traditional relationship between the 
Canadian Prime Minister and his Cabinet 
colleagues has to be transactional. It 
permits Ministers to retain regional 
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loyalties and to represent 
regional interests within the 
Cabinet."(46) 
Provincial leaders expect bargaining concessions from 
the Prime Minister.(47) Thrcrugh the optimal policy-
making system, the Prime Minister dispenses functional 
responsibilities to his Cabinet members who, as a 
result; "tend to discard regional loyalties...and 
bargaining on behalf of regional interest".(48) If, as 
Noel suggests, the ability to govern is based on the 
accommodation of elites at the regional level) "then any 
policy-making system and its decisional technology 
which may either weaken or modify these consociational 
leadership roles strikes at the fundamental determinants 
of stability". (49) 
Policy-making based on P.P.B.S. has been 
subject to criticism and has been fraught with 
difficulties; one example of which was mentioned earlier 
concerning the implementation of new defence priorities. 
The Treasury Board found that it was rather problematical 
to align functional classifications of priorities such 
(46) Szablowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making System: 
Implications for the Canadian Political Process", in 
T.A. Hockin, op_. cit. p. 143. 
(47) Ibid, p. 142. 
(48) Ibid, p. 144. 
(49) IbTd". p. 142. 
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as 'national unity' and 'pollution' with existing 
functional categories. As Doern states; "The Treasury 
Board was then required to...ask departments which of 
their programmes could be identified as assisting the 
function of national unity."(50) Programme forecasts by 
departments, rather than being expressed functionally, are 
still very much incremental and department oriented.(51) 
Disagreement has arisen between Ottawa and the Provinces 
as to the implementation of P.P.B.S. As Doern points out, 
the government has recognized that: "incrementalism has 
come to be characterized less as an unfortunate 
aberration from P.P.B.S. principles, and more as an 
inevitable and even necessary element of a policy and 
budgetary philosophy."(52) 
Although Doern concludes that the pervasive 
influence of P.P.B.S. over the determination of planning, 
and priorities has engendered 'confidence*(53) among 
senior government and civil service officials, this is 
scarcely a unanimous perspective. Walter Stewart alleges 
that policy is developed not by the elected 
representatives in Cabinet, but rather by a 'supergroup1 
(50) Doern, G.B. "The Budgetary Process and the Policy 
Role of the Federal Bureaucracy", in G.B. Doern 
and P. Aucoin. op_. cit. p. 97. 
(51) Ibid, p. 97. 
(52) Ibid, p. 98. 
(53) Ibid, p. 103. 
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of hand-picked Trudeau cohorts in the P.CO. and P.M.O. 
Eric Kierans resigned from the Cabinet largely because 
of the inability of Cabinet members to influence policy 
which had already been decided upon by the P.M.O. and 
P.CO.(54) His resignation illustrates Doern1s point 
that policy is often determined by Cabinet Committees 
rather than by the Cabinet itself.(55) 
The influence of the Prime Minister and his 
staff has been described as analogous to that of the 
American President and his advisors. Denis Smith argues 
that through the parliamentary reforms of 1968 by which 
the Trudeau government; "diverted detailed debate on 
all estimates and virtually all legislation from the 
floor of the House to specialized committees,"(56) 
and through Rule 75C, which permitted the government 
to; "in the absense of agreement by the other parties,... 
timetable discussions on the stage of individual 
bills."(57) Smith contends that through Prime 
Ministerial power over the bureaucracy, the Prime 
Minister has$ "created around him a presidential 
(54) Stewart, Walter. op_. cit. pp. 166-170. 
(55) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organizations 
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin. 
op. cit. pp. 55-56. 
(56) Smith, Denis, "President and Parliament: The 
Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada", 
in T.A. Hockin. op. cit. p. 237. 
(57) Ibid, p. 237. 
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office".(58) Although Smith ascribes to Trudeau 
"unerring presidential instincts",(59) the value of 
his research is not so much his conclusions but rather 
the evidence he compiles to indicate the tremendous 
control and power exercized by Mr. Trudeau over policy-
making. The implications for the Canadian political 
process are that while the characterization of the 
Trudeau government as * parliamentary* may well be naive, 
intimations of a * closet president* are brash and 
eclectic. No doubt, however, Canada does have "prime 
ministerial" government. 
(b) Military Professionalism and De-unification 
Certainly one of the most disturbing aspects of 
the redefinition of defence priorities has been the 
deterioration of military morale with particular regard 
to what many members of the military consider a decline 
in professionalism. The critical issues appear to be 
the perceived ascendency of military managers over 
commanders and the * non-military* roles prescribed by 
Defence in the 70*s. 
(53) Ibid, p. 239. 
(59) Ibid, p. 238. 
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As Colonel A.P. Wills points out: 
"In our lemming-like rush to espouse the 
totems of management theory...we seem 
to have lost sight of those fundamental 
attitudes and practices which have 
eternally assured that a military force 
is greater than the sum of its parts... 
Although of like size to a large 
corporation, the Canadian forces serve 
a different purpose and must be 
fundamentally different in nature and 
outlook."(60) 
Implicit in Colonel Wills* remark is the rejection of 
civilian management of the military in the absence of 
retaining those characteristics which are distinctively 
military. This sentiment persists; it is the view 
that military professionalism is derived from the 
traditional values of leadership, command and military 
training, exercized in response to a foreseen or 
unforeable threat to national security. As Major 
T.B. Winfield points out: 
"No management theory, civilianizing 
process, technical revolution or edict 
from on high, will elicit the deserved 
response from units or servicemen in 
action. Those who have not learned 
about leadership in peace will not 
^ commence to practice it in war. If 
we condone in peacetime promotion on 
the basis of administrative or technical 
competence alone, we may well be seen 
to lack what it takes to respond to 
our country*s expectations in an 
emergency."(61) 
(60) Wills, Colonel A.P. "What the Service Needs is a 
Return to the Old Military Virtues", in Canadian 
Defence Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 3, 1974. pp. 7-8. 
(61) Winfield, Major T.B. "Challenge, Isolation and 
Burden of Command", in Canadian Defence Quarterly. 
vol. 4, NO. 4. 1975. p~ryr. 
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The corollary problem of course is the emphasis 
upon * national development* and aid to the civil 
authority in the absence of more *respectable* military 
occupations. Such dilemmas led to a seminar in 
Kingston in 1971, on the question of professionalism in 
the services. Richard Preston contributed a paper 
which argued that although the military may resent such 
•civilian* roles, strategic realities dictated that a 
traditional military posture would, for Canada, be 
unrealistic. He stressed that contributing to "national 
development* was not unique nor without precedent in 
the history of Canadian forces; further, given the 
events of October, 1970 and the military participation 
in that crisis, 'aid to the civil authorities* was a 
legitimate and respectable military role.(62) He 
recommended however, that critical to the maintenance of 
a high standard of professionalism was multi-purpose 
training to provide for 'conventional strategic 
deterrence'(63) both domestically and abroad. Despite 
Preston's optimism, reluctance to perform 'civilian' 
(62) Preston, R.A. "The Military Profession in Canada 
in the Seventies: Its Potential for Contribution 
to Conventional Deterrence", in Papers from 
Contributors to the Study of Professionalism in 
the Armed Forces.C.D.S. Directive 5/2/70 (Ottawa: 
Queens Printer,~1970) pp. 9-19. 
(63) Ibid, p. 19. 
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roles does not appear to have diminished. 
The civilianizing of management of the forces 
continues to be a source of irritation, if not outrage, 
for the military. The positive benefits of civilian 
control and direction have become mired in the excesses 
of civilian hegemony through the obsession with optimal 
planning. With the restructuring of headquarters, the 
responsibilities of the Deputy Minister and the Chief 
of Defence Staff were merged. As a result, the chain 
of command is interspersed with civilians who know little 
about military operations(64) and whose: 
"sympathies and aspirations seem likely 
to lie with the Treasury Board and the 
civil service hierarchy. As a result 
of this merger, the field commanders 
report to the CD.S. and the staff 
report to the Deputy Minister. This 
makes the Minister the Commander-in-
Chief...The CD.S. could perhaps be 
considered the Commander-in-Chief 
except that his every move and direction 
has to have the support and concurrence 
of the Deputy Minister, who controls in 
exacting detail, all policy development 
and the provision and administration 
of personnel and materiel."(65) 
The restructuring at headquarters also provided 
for the appointment of Assistant Deputy Ministers having 
(64) Neelin, Colonel J.E. and Pederson, Colonel L.M. 
"The Administrative Structure of the Canadian 
Armed Forces: Over-Centralized and Overly Staff 
Ridden", in Canadian Defence Quarterly. Vol 4, 
No. 2, 1974. pp. 36-37. 
(65) Ibid, p. 37. 
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functional responsibilities (policy and strategic 
planning, personnel, finance and materiel). As Colonel 
J.E. Neelin and Colonel L.M. Pederson point out: 
"It is the A.D.M.s who develop and define 
military policy...It is therefore the 
D.M. and the A.D.M.s who perform the 
important military functions, vis & vis 
the CD.S. and the commanders. Their 
enormous authority reaches down through 
separate channels to the lowest field 
units and there seemed to be no way they 
can be held to account for anything 
short of calamitous failure."(66) 
The concern then, and it is quite justifiable, is that 
in the event of an emergency situation, the Canadian 
response will be exercized by staff officers and 
civilians through an extraordinary centralized, complex 
and lengthy chain of command. 
The preface to de-unification occurred in the 
fall of 1974 when Minister of National Defence, 
Richardson, threatened defence budget cuts, which would 
reduce personnel and prohibit the purchase of desperately 
needed new equipment while at the same time requiring 
continued multi-tasking. Richardson argued that it was 
better to have a well equipped force of 50,000 than 
80,000 who were not. As John Gellner has asserted, 
Richardson's point was: "...irrelevant. If the mission 
of an armed force is such that it cannot be accomplished 
(66) Ibid. P. 38. 
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by 50,000 men then it obviously does not greatly 
matter how well paid they are or how well fed and 
equipped."(67) Criticism poured in from the military, 
the Royal Canadian Legion and the Canadian Defence 
Association. In November, the government announced an 
11.2$ increase in military spending.(68) 
In mid-January of this year, Mr. Richardson 
announced the creation of an Air Command and a $275 
million increase in the defence budget:(69) 
"Once again, the Canadian Armed Forces 
will have three distinct commands -
the Sea, the Land, and the Air. The 
CD.S. General Dextraze and I have come 
to the conclusion that it is of the 
greatest importance for the Sailor, the 
Soldier and the Airman, while still 
being part of a unified force, to remain 
within, and to progress within, specific 
service channeIs...we have decided to 
form an Air Command similar in function 
to the Maritime and Mobile Command."(70) 
A few weeks later, in February, Mr. Richardson suggested that 
the N.O.R.A.D. agreement be extended indefinitely. In 
May, he announced that Canada would henceforth control 
(67) Gellner, John. "Cutting Budget or Undercutting 
Defence", in the Globe and Mail, (October 15, 1974). 
p. 7. 
(68) "Battle of the Budget", in Time. January 27, 1975. 
Vol. 105, No. 4, p. 4. 
(69) "Defence Shakeup to Give Canada an Air Command", 
in Toronto Daily Star, January 17, 1975. p. 1. 
(70) Richardson, Minister of Defence, James, quoted in 
Major M.B. Gausden. "Defence Limps On Despite 
Inflation; Major Questions Still Unresolved; 
Unification Begins to Bow Out", in Royal Canadian 
Military Institute Year Book. 1974. (Toronto: Royal 
Canadian Military Institute, 1975). p. 8. 
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her own air defence with two new N.O.R.A.D. regions 
in North Bay and Edmonton. The Air Command would be 
placed in Winnipeg, Mr. Richardson's constituency. 
It would be premature to judge how the new Air 
Command will affect civil-military management at 
headquarters, indeed, it may even be premature to 
suggest that the forces are in fact, being de-unified. 
Both Mr. Richardson and General Dextraze insist that 
the forces shall remain 'unified'.(71) Such statements 
however, are misleading. During a press conference in 
Ottawa, Mr. Richardson distinctly left the impression 
that 'unified' forces did not mean unification, but 
rather 'integration'. The implications of his remarks 
are that the separation of land, sea and air contingents 
are a return to the integration phase of the 1964 White 
Paper on Defence. 
(4) Summary 
Despite Prime Minister Trudeau*s enthusiasm for 
* rationally contrived* policy objectives, their 
implementation through P.P.B.S. has been less than 
entirely satisfactory. The adjustment to cross-departmental 
programming has produced confusion while at the same time, 
(71) "Defence Shakeup to give Canada an Air Command", 
in Toronto Daily Star. op_. cit. 
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recognition, that policy outputs may necessarily have 
to incorporate incremental aspects as well. Furthermore, 
the dramatically increased numbers of appointed policy 
advisors has led some observers, and Cabinet members, 
to believe that the Cabinet*s role in policy matters 
has been surreptitiously handed over to the * supergroup* 
in the P.M.O. 
In defence matters, the co-ordination of other 
departments with National Defence has proved complicated 
and the redefinition of defence priorities has left the 
military somewhat bewildered as to their appropriate 
role. This dilemma has been further compounded by the 
permeation of headquarters with civilian staff and by 
the recent announcements that command would be de-unified. 
Such factors, coupled with the scarcity of resources for 
equipment purchases are undoubtedly responsible for the 
state of melancholy which has beset Canada*s armed 
forces. 
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Chapter V: Conclusions and Observations 
This research paper was based on the premise 
that previous analyses of /uniflcatJjHL>__emphasizing 
service tradition and identity, command structures and 
management, or even nationalism, were ^ne-f sufficient 
to justify the agenda for unification as proposed by 
Mr. Paul Hellyer.^ (The inadequacy of such analyses was 
a result of the failure to comprehend unification as 
a part of the political environment. Unification was 
inexorably related to the policy-process through 
which the civilian authority would attain its capability 
to determine the priorities of defence. This capability 
could not be accomplished through integration, because 
integration alone would not permit the * structuring 
of influence* necessary in the policy-making process to 
ensure the civilian control and direction of the military. 
The ability of a government to determine its 
defence policy, is directly related to the policy-making 
process. This is not to infer that the substantive 
character of defence policy will necessarily change,but 
rather, that the government*s ability to effect policy, 
relative to the degree of competition with the defence 
establishment, will change. Unification then, became 
the method through which the * structuring of influence* 
in the policy-making process was transformed. 
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The military's legacy, both during and after 
World War II, of transgressing their responsibilities, 
coupled with Mr. Diefenbaker's incrementalist approach 
to policy and .his reliance upon General Pearkes, meant 
that the civilian perspective in the formulation of 
defence policy was severely limited. It remained for 
Mr. Pearson, and ultimately Mr. Hellyer, to re-assert 
civilian supremacy. This led of course, to the defence 
policy review and unification. 
Significantly, the transition in the 'structuring 
of influence' which occurred between the government and 
the defence establishment, paralleled the transition in 
the policy-making process. The expansion and 
differentiation of policy-making organs, the new sources 
of policy input and the introduction of SIMPAC and 
P.P.B.S. signalled a re-orientation as to how policy 
V^would be determined. The incrementalist approach to 
policy, though still prevalent, would no longer be the 
sole basis of policy planning. 
With the election of Prime Minister Trudeau, 
policy-making became even more synonymous with the 
P.P.B.S. approach. Since unification had already cpnfirmed 
civilian hegemony in defence matters,it remained for Mr. 
Trudeau to incorporate defence policy into the 
prescriptions of national policy objectives. This then, 
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was the defence policy review announced in April, 1969, 
which culminated in the publication Defence in the 70*s. 
Despite the initial confidence in a more 
* rational* approach to policy-making, it soon became 
evident that incrementalism would not be entirely 
abandoned, nor could the Prime Minister*s staff presume 
to acquire such a preponderance of influence in the 
policy-making process without creating dissention at 
the Cabinet level. In terms of defence, the infusion 
of civilians into National Defence Headquarters after 
1971, coupled with what were regarded as * non-military* 
roles for the Canadian Armed Forces, led to significant 
consternation among serving officers as to their 
* identity*. 
The implications of these events are not, as 
Messrs. Doern and Aucoin would have one believe, that 
the policy-making process is evolving towards a 'greater 
good*, expressed through a more highly differentiated, 
expanded and centralized policy apparatus. Conversely, 
this research paper suggests that the degree of 
centralization endemic to an optimalized policy-making 
process necessarily leads to entropy among the components 
of the system. This has resulted from the Government*s 
failure to recognize the need for, as in the case of the 
military, special skills, or the failure, or unwillingness 
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of the Government to comprehend that the pervasive 
influence of such a centralized hierarchy can lead to 
the deterioration, as Szablowski has argued, of the 
practices and .institutions upbn which it is founded. 
Unification then, through asserting civilian 
direction and control, has also prepared the stage 
for Prime Minister Trudeau and his staff to inundate 
the military command structure with civilians. This 
is not intended to suggest that the Prime Minister*s 
staff have become * commissars* to the field forces, but 
rather that they have intruded into the management of 
the forces at headquarters. Whereas Paul Hellyer 
sought to assert civilian control through the elimination 
of separate commands and the expansion of civilian 
participation, under Pierre Trudeau the excesses of 
civilian participation have contributed to the return 
of elemental command, that is, de-unification. This is 
^undoubtedly a retrogressive step because separate 
command structures, whether they are called Air Command, 
MARCOM and MOBCOM, or Army, Navy and Air Force, will 
inevitably lead to difficulties identical with those 
which existed prior to the 1964 White Paper on Defence. 
With the spectre of de-unification close at 
hand, what emerges from this research is that if Canada 
is to have a credible defence policy, one which is 
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compatible both with the roles to be performed and 
with the military, then Canada must refrain from 
indulging in further structural change, and concentrate 
upon accomplishing the priori-ties defined in Defence 
in the 70*s. 
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